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ABSTRACT

Three Essays on Housing Market in Hong Kong:
Implications for Public Policy and Macro Economy

by

WONG Wai Chung Gary

Doctor of Philosophy

The thesis contains three papers on different areas of housing study in Hong
Kong. The first paper focuses on government policy in public housing privatization
on housing market and its effect on the overall economy. By comparing the negative
impacts of two financial crises in 1997 and 2008 on housing market, the paper tries
to offer explanation for the property downturn during 1997-2003. It aims to study
how a public housing privatization program would produce adverse effects on
housing transactions and the economy. The second one links up the housing market
and macro economy. It is found that housing sector appears to serve as a link
between exports and domestic expenditures. Housing prices are found to be driven
by exports and interest rates over a long period, while housing prices in turn drive
domestic expenditures. The last one attempts to investigate the dynamics of private
housing market in Hong Kong. Using the cointegarting approach, the paper
identifies two cointegrating relations, ie. a long run demand side relation between
property price, prime rate, housing price expectation and GDP per capita, and supply
side relation between private housing completion, property price, prime rate and
land cost, which show a short run disequilibrium dynamics in demand and supply of
private housing during 1985 – 2008.
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I. INTRODUCTION

The thesis contains three papers on different areas of housing study in Hong
Kong. Expenditures on housing represent the single largest item of expenditures for
most households in Hong Kong. Expenditures on housing purchases, in particular,
amount to many years of income (around 8.7 years of median household income in
2009, research report, Bank of East Asia). Undoubtedly, housing is very important
element in the macro economy. This thesis focus on few important issues in housing
economics including demand and supply, privatization of public housing, and the
relation between housing and marco economy. .

By comparing the housing market reactions to Asian Financial Crisis, Financial
Tsunami, the first paper offers alternative explanation for the housing market
downtown during 1998-2003. It is evidenced that a public housing privatization
program produced adverse effects on housing transactions and prices in Hong Kong.
A scheme announced in December 1997, offering tenants an opportunity to buy their
units at deeply discounted prices, reduced public housing tenants‘ bids for private
homes and adversely affected home transactions. This effect is more pronounced
than the effects of the Asian Financial Crisis. An effect on housing prices is also
indirectly demonstrated through a demonstration that a structural break in the
housing price relationship occurred at the time the privatization program is
introduced.

The second paper shows that, consistent with the ―economic base‖ theory,
exports drive domestic consumption and domestic investment, but housing appears to
serve as an important link between exports and domestic expenditures. Focusing on

the Hong Kong economy, which is a small open economy with a big population, I
found that exports and interest rates drive housing prices over a long period, while
housing prices in turn drive domestic expenditures.

The last one attempts to investigate the disequilibrium dynamics of private
housing market in Hong Kong. Many empirical researches on housing market are
traditionally based on the assumption that market is almost in equilibrium status.
Nevertheless, we can observed that housing market is more often in disequilibrium as
reflected by cost search, reservation demand and slow response of supply during
excess demand. Using the cointegarting approach, the paper identifies two
cointegrating relations, ie. a long run demand side relation between housing property
price, prime rate, price expectation and income, and supply side relation between
private housing completion, property price, and land cost, which shows a short run
disequilibrium dynamics in demand and supply of private housing during 1984 –
2008. Impulse response and variance decomposition are employed to shed light on
the dynamics structure in the VECM model.

2

II. ESSAY ONE

Comparing the Effects of the Asian Financial Crisis, Financial
Tsunami and the Tenants Purchase Scheme: A Study of External
and Policy Shocks on the Hong Kong Housing Market

3

1. Introduction

The Hong Kong economy had been well known for its legendary resilience.
Despite a number of momentous setbacks, which included the Great Proletariat
Cultural Revolution in 1966 through 1976, two major oil crises that plunged most
countries of the world into recession during the 1970s, and several episodes of
financial and banking crises, not a single year since 1961 was there recorded
negative economic growth (see Table 1). Indeed the Hang Seng Index plunged from
over 1,700 in 1973 to little more than 150 in 1975 without causing an economic
decline in any of these years. The banking crises of 1965-66 ―at a point posed a
threat to the entire banking system in Hong Kong,‖ (Jao, 1993, p. 242), while those
of 1982 to 1986 ―were even bigger in scale and produced more far-reaching
repercussions.‖ (Jao, op.cit.).

Table 1. Hong Kong‟s Economic Growth 1961-2008 (GDP % change)
Year
%
Year
%
Year
%
Year
%
Year
change

change

change

change

%
change

1961

N.A. 1971

7.2 1981

9.4 1991

5.7 2001

0.5

1962

14.2 1972

10.5 1982

3.0 1992

6.1 2002

1.8

1963

15.7 1973

12.3 1983

5.9 1993

6.0 2003

3.0

1964

8.6 1974

2.3 1984

9.9 1994

6.0 2004

8.5

1965

14.5 1975

0.4 1985

0.7 1995

2.3 2005

7.1

1966

1.7 1976

16.2 1986

11.0 1996

4.2 2006

7.0

1967

1.7 1977

11.8 1987

13.4 1997

5.1 2007

6.4

1968

3.4 1978

8.4 1988

8.4 1998

-6.0 2008

2.1

1969

11.3 1979

11.6 1989

2.2 1999

2.6 2009

-2.7

1970

9.2 1980

10.3 1990

3.9 2000

8.0

Source: Gross Domestic Product 1961-2008, Government of HKSAR, plus updates from:
http://www.info.gov.hk/hkecon/gdp/index.htm
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The Hong Kong economy had suffered under both the Asian Financial Crisis in
1997 and the Global Financial Tsunami in 2008. But the behaviours of the housing
market during the two crises were very different. Comparing the property price
movements one year after the outbreak of each financial crisis, property prices fell
much more dramatically after the outbreak of the AFC, The decline amounted to
45% from the pre-crisis peak by October 1998 and a further 39% between 1998 and
2003. One year after the outbreak of the Global Financial Tsunami, housing prices
were almost at the same level in October 2009 as in September 2008 and even
reached a new height in 2010 first quarter (Hong Kong Property Review 2008,
Rating and Valuation Department of HKSAR). Yet the financial tsunami in 2008 is a
global crisis, and was even said to be the most serious in a century. Indeed, Hong
Kong‘s exports fell much more in the wake of the global financial tsunami.(Table 3)
The Hang Seng Index in Oct 2008 was 65% lower than its pre-crisis peak as
compared to the 60% drop in Aug 1998 during the Asian Financial Crisis (see Table
2).

The years during and following the Asian Financial Crisis were far less
tumultuous. Hong Kong‘s major trading partners, the US and Mainland China,
continued to grow rapidly during the time, while stock market declines were far
milder than what happened from 1973 to 1975. Moreover, not a single bank failed.
Yet the Hong Kong economy shrank by 6 per cent in 1998. This turnout deviated so
much from predictions that Jao referred to it as ―one of the most bizarre and
egregious failures in the history of economic forecasting.‖ (Jao, 2001, p.140). Table 1
also shows that the rebound in 1999 is extremely weak, quite unlike the rebounds
that followed earlier recessions.

5

Table 2. Indicator of Changes of Confidence/External Shocks
HSI performance during
HSI performance during
Asian Financial Crisis

Global Financial Tsunami

Quarter or

Hang Seng

Year on

Quarter or

Hang Seng

Year on

Month

Index

year %

Month

Index

year %

At End of

Change

At End of

Change

Period

(month/

Period

(month/

Quarterly)
97 Aug

16673*

98 Aug

6660#

98 Q3

7883

98 Q4

10049

99 Q1
99 Q2

Quarterly)
07 Oct

31638*

08 Oct

11015#

08 Q4

14387

27.48%

09 Q1

13576

-5.64%

10942

8.89%

09 Q2

18378

35.38%

13532

23.67%

09 Q3

20955

14.02%

-60.00%

Source: http://finance.yahoo.com/q/hp?s=^HSI

* = pre-crisis peak

-65.18%

# = bottom

Table 3. Indicator of External Shocks
Exports Sector performance during

Exports Sector performance during

Asian Financial Crisis

Global Financial Tsunami

Quarter

HK$

Year on

million

year %

Quarter

HK$

Year on

million

year %

Change

Change

98 Q1

295,463

1.0

08 Q3

755,018

1.3

98 Q2

332,348

-0.6

08 Q4

712,987

-4.9

98 Q3

339,062

-7.3

09 Q1

513,309

-22.7

98 Q4

331,053

-9.9

09 Q2

621,064

-12.8

99 Q1

281,301

-4.8

09 Q3

655,043

-13.2

99 Q2

325,517

-2.1

09 Q4

692,651

-2.9

Note:
HK$ chained (2008)
Source: Hong Kong Monthly Digest of Statistics, Census & Statistics Dept of HKSAR, various
years.

The often-cited explanation for Hong Kong‘s deep recession, that the AFC burst
the property price bubble and thus produced a gigantic negative wealth effect, is
6

simply unconvincing (Jao, 2001, p.140). The transmission mechanism whereby the
AFC burst the property price bubble is not clear. First, although foreign participation
in the office building sector was indeed quite significant, foreign participation in the
housing market has never been significant. There is no evidence that a big
withdrawal of foreign capital from the housing market produced a collapse. Second,
although inter-bank interest rates went up in the wake of the currency troubles in
South East Asia, mortgage rates had been relatively stable. Hong Kong had seen
bigger mortgage rate hikes before but had never encountered such serious depression
in the housing market.1 Third, it is not true that confidence collapsed overnight.
Indicators suggest that people had regained confidence not long after the Asian
Financial Crisis (Table 2).

It is sometimes thought that with the opening up of China Hong Kong‘s
middleman role, which had been important in supporting the entire economy, was
diminished. But China did not start opening up in 1997 or 1998. The suddenness of
the reversal suggests that there may be other reasons. Moreover, an examination of
trade data, including service trade and merchandise trade, suggests that Hong Kong‘s
decline in exports in the period after 1997 was in line with decline in global trade,
and was actually smaller relative to Korea, Taiwan, the UK, or the US.

This paper offers an alternative explanation to Hong Kong‘s housing market
downturn during 1998-2003. The hypothesis is that a public housing privatization
scheme introduced by the government played an important role in reducing existing
home transactions and home prices. This hypothesis will be substantiated both by

1

Some commentators cited high real interest rates as the culprit, but the deflation that caused
7

theory and by statistical evidence.

Privatization is often believed to be conducive to economic efficiency. Even
though this effect is still controversial, any suggestion that privatization could lead to
the erosion of wealth and economic inefficiency would seem ludicrous to
economists.

This paper presents evidence that suggests such a possibility. A privatization
scheme, if managed poorly, could lead to counter-intuitive results. Working through
the ―housing ladder effect,‖ or otherwise called the equity effect or the down
payment effect, such as described by Stein (1995), Bardhan, Datta, Edelstein, and
Kim (2003), Ortalo-Magne and Rady (2006), Ho & Wong (2009), privatizing public
housing cheaply could lead to the erosion of equity values among homeowners,
which could spread throughout the housing market through the housing market
quality continuum. The erosion of wealth works dynamically, and wipes out any
static efficiency gains that could result from the privatization.

The housing market is a continuum with a full range of qualities and prices and
that homeowners trade up to a better quality when they have accumulated sufficient
equity in their current homes. The ability to trade up depends crucially on the prices
of existing homes. When prices collapse at the lower end of the market, they transmit
readily to higher quality homes with a noticeable shrinkage in transaction volumes. I
hypothesize that the very attractive prices offered by the Housing Authority for
sitting tenants to buy their own units under the ―Tenants Purchase Scheme,‖ (TPS)

high real interest rates did not occur until late 1998, AFTER the major collapse of housing prices.
8

offering up to 88% discount on the estimated market price for buyers making a quick
decision to buy, made it unattractive for them to buy other kinds of homes. Given
their earlier documented significant participation in the housing market this
unavoidably caused home prices to decline.

This paper introduces a new methodology that throws light on the relative
influence of the public housing privatization program, the Asian Financial Crisis and
the Financial Tsunami on housing transactions in Hong Kong. I present evidence that
the housing privatization program also adversely and significantly affected home
prices—and for a much longer time—by demonstrating that a structural break in the
housing price relationship occurred at exactly the time the TPS policy took effect.

Section II presents a review of Hong Kong‘s housing market and the public
housing privatization program. Section III provides the data description and outlines
the statistical tests to be conducted. Empirical evidence is presented in Section IV.
The final section presents the conclusions.

2. The Public Housing Privatization Program

Economists normally expect that a privatization program would make the
economy more efficient. The experience in Hong Kong shows that this cannot be
taken for granted. The circumstances, in which a privatization program is conducted,
as well as how the privatization takes place, play an important role in determining the
outcome.

On December 8, 1997, the Housing Authority in Hong Kong announced that
9

sitting tenants in designated public housing estates could buy their own flats at up to
88% discount off the estimated market price. The move was cheered by the local
press and thought to engender a large positive wealth effect that would boost
consumption and give Hong Kong‘s economic growth a big push. However, what
transpired was a big and immediate economic slump. In the first quarter of 1998, the
Hong Kong economy declined sharply by an unprecedented 12 per cent on a
quarter-to-quarter basis (not seasonally adjusted).

The first quarter GDP decline was puzzling not only because of its magnitude
but also because of the apparent favorable circumstances of the economy at the same
time. The currency turmoil had shown signs of stabilizing, to the extent that it
actually allowed one interest rate drop. The HK Policy Research Institute‘s housing
property confidence index shot up from 35.5 in January to 94.2 in March 1998. The
Heng Seng index rose 7.4 per cent in the quarter.

What explained this sudden and dramatic reversal amid signs of revival of
investor confidence? The hypothesis that I advance in this paper, to be tested using
various statistical tests, is that the public housing privatization scheme actually
severed the housing ladder that had been in effect for years prior to the
announcement of the TPS. There was evidence that public housing tenants had been
important players in the housing market. In a survey in 1992, which was conducted
by the Housing Authority, it was found that 24 percent of all housing transactions
were due to public housing tenants and that 13 per cent of all public housing tenants
already owned at least one residential property. Starting in April 1987, the Housing
Authority had been implementing a policy to make the richer tenants with at least 10

10

year residence in the public rent housing estate to pay higher rent. 2 This provided a
big incentive for the better-off tenants to buy homes as a back-up in the event they
were asked to pay higher rent. The TPS effectively reversed this policy, for from now
on rich tenants needed not leave. They were offered an opportunity to capitalize all
their future rental subsidies through a purchase decision.

As expected, the demand for Home Ownership Scheme (HOS) housing—a
government subsidized homeownership scheme—suddenly collapsed. HOS housing
used to attract many public housing tenants to buy. Indeed they were always many
times oversubscribed ever since the scheme started in 1978. Disappointed buyers
would have to buy in the open market, where HOS units fetched very high prices,
reflecting again the strong buying power enjoyed by the richer tenants. Starting in
June 1997, the Housing Authority allowed HOS owners to resell, after two years
from their dates of original purchase, their units to public housing tenants and other
Green Form Applicants without having to repay the land premium. Records of such
transactions indicate that public housing tenant buyers were paying very high prices
for these flats, indicating their strong purchasing power.3
2

In essence, the policy requires that tenants who have been accommodated for over ten years be

subjected to a means test.

If the household income exceeds three times that of the maximum

eligibility limit, it will have to pay double the standard rent.

Those who have breached stipulated

income and asset thresholds are required to pay market rent. See ―Safeguarding Rational Allocation of
Public Housing Resources: A Consultation Document‖ published by the Hong Kong Housing
Authority in December 1995.
3

Transactions with prices were downloadable from the Housing Authority webpage but the

information is all in Chinese. Starting in 2003 data earlier than 2002 were no longer downloadable.
However, I had examined the earlier records and found one transaction at 3.95 million Hong Kong
dollars for a 644 square feet flat in Kowloon in September 1997. This was not an exceptional case in
1997. Watanabe (1998) provided figures showing that public housing tenants generally saved much
more than either HOS or private housing owners as well as private housing tenants, particularly in
1994/95.
11

With the announcement of the TPS, HOS units suddenly lost their appeal,
because in comparison they were ridiculously expensive. Some 250,000 HOS owners
suddenly found that their units could hardly find buyers. Immediately they found
difficulty trading up to better homes in the private housing market. Transactions in
the existing home market plunged, in turn freezing transactions in the new homes
market, which at the time almost exclusively depended on buyers trading up (see
Figure 1). Some commentators argued that the increase in supply of housing, in
particular, the HOS housing would also produce negative impacts on housing price
and transaction. In fact, HOS housing is not a new thing to the public and it has long
been an important part of housing market during the 1980s and 1990s (see Figure 2).
Also, the production of housing excluding the TPS units during 1998-2003 did not
show an obvious jump as compared to its production during the past 2 decades. On
the other hand, the TPS units became available overnight. The response to the TPS
was enthusiastic. While only 19,807 units were sold by the end of March 1999
(Annual Report 00/01, Hong Kong Housing Authority of HKSAR), many public
housing tenants were looking forward to the day when they could buy their units.

Since public housing tenants were the primary source of buyers for HOS
housing, the effect of TPS on HOS housing market was immediate. HOS housing
owners found that buyers had suddenly disappeared and were no longer able to trade
up. Similarly, other homeowners who depended on HOS buyers as their principal
buyers also could not trade up because they also could not find buyers.

12

Figure 1. Total Second Hand Residential Housing Transactions
(07/1995 - 09/2009 Monthly Data)
No. of units
20,000
18,000
16,000
14,000
12,000
10,000
8,000
6,000
4,000
2,000
9507

9704

9901

0010

02/07

04/04

06/01

07/10

09/07

Source: Data provided by Research Dept, Centraline Property Agency Ltd.

Notwithstanding a highly stimulative budget in 1998 providing generous tax
relief, generous home starter loans, and an unprecedented tax allowance given to
homeowners for the mortgage interest payments, the housing market continued to
fall. By 1999 the Asian Financial Crisis was over. There was no longer any premium
on Hong Kong dollar‘s forward exchange rates, and real estate prices had risen
markedly in Singapore.4 Hong Kong‘s housing prices, however, continued to decline.
Even the 10.2 per cent growth in 2000 failed to lift prices, as home prices continued
to slip by another 14 to 15 per cent. By September 2001 they had fallen back to
levels reached 10 years ago. By 2003 housing prices generally had lost over 65 per
cent or more of their 1997 values.

4

Singapore housing prices fell again subsequent to the bursting of the IT bubble.
13

Figure 2. Completion of Private Residential Units, Subsidized Sale Flats
and Tenants Purchase Scheme Units, 1980-2008
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Sources: Hong Kong Monthly Digest of Statistics, various issues, Censes & Statistics Dept of
HKSAR, and Hong Kong Property Review, various years, Rating & Valuation Dept of HKSAR.

3.

The Data and Statistical Tests

Two statistical tests provide support to our theory. The first one (the ―effect on
transactions‖ test) is to show that TPS was the key factor behind the big drop in
existing home transactions. In a multivariate regression controlling the effects of
various factors on existing home transactions, the TPS dummy was found to explain
the decline in home transactions far better than the Asian Financial Crisis. The
second test (the ―timing test‖) shows that, while exports, mortgage rate and consumer
price had been the driving factor behind housing prices this relationship showed a
structural change after 1997. Using the Johansen co-integration model with both an
intercept and an interactive TPS/exports dummy, I found a structural break at the
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time of the announcement of the TPS. This suggests that housing probably serve as a
transmission mechanism between the external (the exports) sector and the domestic
sector, but this mechanism appears to have been severed by the TPS policy.

In the first test, the focus of analysis is second-hand transaction volume for
private sector residential properties. This variable is of great interest because
normally when a homeowner sells his property he would buy another. In contrast, to
the extent that new housing has already been produced and a new home purchase
represents only a transfer from the developer‘s inventory to the homebuyer, buying
an existing home generates more additional economic activities than when a
household buys a new unit from the developer.5
Figure 3. 12-Month Forward Rate Premium/Discount of
the US Dollar on the HK Dollar
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Source: Monthly Statistical Bulletin, various issues, Hong Kong Monetary Authority.

5

A ―tree‖ of second hand transactions usually ends up in a first hand high end property. On the
other hand, if a first time buyer buys a new home the economic stimulation is more limited.
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Figure 4. Ted Spread - Difference between 3 Month Treasury Bill Rate
and the 3-Month Eurodollar Rate
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Source: Data are obtained from Datastream

The housing price of private domestic flats is treated as a variable to explain
second-hand transactions. The data on this variable is the monthly housing price
index of private domestic units, which is supplied by the Rating and Valuation
Department of the Government. The period covered in this study is from July 1995 to
March 2004. Second-hand transaction data is not available before July 1995. The
period covered both the Asian Financial Crisis and the Tenants Purchase Scheme
(TPS)—the public housing privatization program of the Housing Authority.

Besides, dummy variables are used to capture the effects of key changes in the
environment, namely the Asian Financial Crisis Dummy (AFC), Global Financial
Crisis Dummy (GFA) and the Tenants Purchase Scheme (TPS) - as well as a dummy
to control the first quarter effect of home purchase pattern (FQR) which may affect
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transaction volume.6 During times of acute loss of confidence such as resulting from
the Asian Financial Crisis, the local currency is subjected to tremendous pressures to
depreciate. While the spot exchange rate holds its place a considerable discount in
the value of the local currency appears in the forward market. I therefore find it
convenient to use the forward market premium of the US dollar over the spot market
exchange rate as an instrument to measure the degree of the financial crisis (see
Figure 3.). The Global Financial Crisis in 2008 is proxied by the TED spread - the
price difference between three-month futures contracts for U.S. Treasuries and
three-month contracts for Eurodollars (see Figure 4). Yields on US Treasuries can be
taken as a risk-free rate of return. When banks charge one another for short term
lending at a higher rate, the premium reflects compensation for perceived risk. An
important advantage of using such ―non-binary dummies‖ is that there is no need to
make the necessarily arbitrary judgment as to when the financial crisis is ―switched
on‖ and when it is ―switched off.‖ In order to facilitate interpretation, I normalize
these variables to set the maximum value of this dummy within the observation period
to unity.7

Since the TPS was announced by the Hong Kong Housing Authority on
December 8 1997 we assign the value of ‗0‘ to months prior to December 1997 and
assigned the value of unity for the months from December 1997 onwards. The policy
is ―switched off‖ by an announcement made in November 2002. The data for
mortgage rate is obtained from Hong Kong Monetary Authority. CPI and total
exports statistics are obtained from officially released statistics. For the list and
definition of variables that are analyzed, please refer to Table 9.

6
7

This effect has to do with the fact that Chinese New Year falls in the first quarter.
The value of this dummy is therefore 1 at the point of most intensive pressure for the currency
17

4.

Empirical Findings

4.1 The Relative Effects of TPS and the Two Financial Crises on Transactions and
Prices
In this test I attempt to assess the relative impacts of the introduction of the TPS,
the Asian Financial Crisis and the Global Financial Crisis on second-hand transaction
volume. The length of the time series allows us to use the Johansen cointegration
method to test the long term relationships of the key variables. The dependent
variable for the first test is the logarithm (log) of the second-hand home transaction
volume (LTRAN). The explanatory variables include the log of the housing price
index (LPPI), mortgage rate (MR), the Asian financial crisis dummy (AFC), Global
financial crisis dummy (GFC), and binary dummy variables TPS (unity from
1997:12, 0 prior to this8), and FQR (1 for first 3 months every year). It is expected
that any increase in housing prices will allow homeowners to trade theirs for better
ones and thus tends to drive up transactions. On the other hand an increase in interest
rates will dampen transactions because this will increase the costs of owning a new
home or a better home.

I begin the analysis by examining the stationarity properties of the variables
using the Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) Test (Dickey and Fuller, 1981). The
optimal lag in the test is chosen by the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC). Table 4.1
shows that the test statistics for all the series in level form and in their first
differences, respectively. The null hypothesis of unit root cannot be rejected when the
series are in level but can be rejected when the series are in first differences, showing

to devalue and 0 when there were no such pressures.
8
In November 2002 the Government announced a plan to terminate the TPS, but termination
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that all the series are integrated of order one.

Table 4.1 Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test of Unit Root (Period: 1995M7 to
2009M11 )
Variable name
Test on
No Trend
Trend
Conclusion
LnTRAN

LnLPPI

Level

-0.8498

1st diff

-12.1277***

Level

-1.4716

1st diff

MR

Level
1st diff

-4.3952***

-1.1855
-6.6066***

-2.9550

I(1)

-12.0611***

-1.1844

I(1)

-4.4779***

-1.5717

I(1)

-6.5854***

Note: 1. 5% critical value for the augmented Dickey-Fuller tests that include constant; and constant
plus trend = 2.87 and -3.43 respectively.
2. The numbers of lags in the two unit root tests are determined by the AIC.
3. *** indicate 1% significance levels.

Since the variables are integrated of the same order I(1), I can use the
well-known Johansen and Juselius procedure (1990). Under this procedure, I first
identify the long-run relationship among LTRAN, LPPI, and MR. Following the
common practice, the dummy variables AFC, GFC, TPS and FQR are all treated as
exogenous I(0) variables in the VAR and the error-correction model.

The co-integration test results are presented in the Table 4.2. The number of
co-integrating vectors r is determined by reference to the λmax and trace statistics.
The lag specification for the Johansen test is determined by Akaike‘s Information
Criterion (AIC). The results show that TRAN, LPPI and MR are cointegrated with
only one cointegrating vector.

was not effective until after 2004, when the last batch of TPS units were sold.
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Table 4.2 Testing Cointegration Using the Johansen Procedure
Cointegrating
Hypothesized
Test
Relation

No. of CE(s)

TRAN

Probability

Statistics
Trace Value

= f (LPPI, MR)
With exogenous dummy

None
At most 1

104.30***
10.40

0.0000
0.2513

variables AFC, GFC, TPS and
FQR
λ max Value
None
At most 1

93.91***
9.45

0.0000
0.2500

Note: *** denotes significance at 1% level.

Table 4.3 Normalized Cointegrating Coefficients Using the Johansen
Procedure
Variables
Coefficient
t-statistic
LTRAN

1

LPPI

-1.0035

MR

0.0153

-7.3766***
1.3543

Note: *** denote 1% significant level

Table 4.3 reports the normalized cointegrating coefficients that will be
interpreted as long run equilibrium coefficients. Coefficients on both LPPI and MR
are shown with the expected signs. In general, price appreciation provides an
incentive and a greater ability for homeowners to trade up, thus pushing up second
hand transaction. The interest rate, on the other hand, discourages home purchases
and tends to dampen transactions. In addition, given that the variables are
cointegrated, I then estimate the error correction model as shown in Table 4.4. The
ECM coefficient enters significantly with negative sign. The significant negative
ECM coefficient confirms our earlier findings that cointegration exists between them.
It is noteworthy that the dampening effect of the Tenants Purchase Scheme (TPS
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dummy) is greater than that of the Asian Financial Crisis (AFC dummy) and Global
Financial Crisis (GFC dummy). Also it is statistically much more significant. (See
Table 4.4 coefficients of the TPS, AFC and GFC dummy). Because both the TPS
dummy and the two financial crisis dummies have values between 0 and 1 their
coefficients can be directly compared with each other. We can see that the effect of
the TPS on second hand transition (coefficient= -0.1348, t=-3.11) is much bigger
than the Asian financial crisis dummy which even does not show a significant
coefficient (coefficient= -0.0519, t=-0.55). The Global financial crisis in 2008 shows
a strongest negative impact on second hand transaction. While if we compare the
effects of the two financial crises and TPS on housing price, the Asian financial crisis
had produced the largest negative impact. To sum up, TPS had a larger impact on
transaction than on price compared to that of the Asian financial crisis. This is in line
with my argument that after the announcement of TPS, HOS units suddenly lost a lot
of potential housing buyer and so they found immediately difficulty trading up to
better homes in the private housing market. Transactions in the overall second home
market and even first hand market therefore would be remained at a low level for
longer period.

Figure 5 shows the residuals from long run cointegrating relation among
LTRAN, LPPI and MR which is mean-reverting over the long run. It is worthy to
note that the second hand transaction had dropped dramatically for several months
both after the outbreak each of two financial crises. Nevertheless, we can see that the
second hand transaction had shown a quick and strong rebound after the Global
financial crisis while the transaction had remained below the long run equilibrium
level for over 5 years after the Asian financial crisis. In view of the different housing
market reactions to the financial crises, obviously, the 1998-2003 experience could
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not be purely explained by the Asian financial crisis and the TPS should play an
important role for explaining the housing market downturn during that period. Note
that over an extended period after the TPS announcement in December 1997 the
residuals remained negative. This is quite unusual. Transactions did not come back to
normal levels until shortly after the announcement of the termination of the TPS
policy in November 2002.

Table 4.4 Error Correction Model
Regressors
ΔTRAN

ΔLPPI

ΔTRAN(-1)

-0.1213(-1.64)*

0.0133(1.43)

ΔTRAN(-2)

-0.0615(-0.87)

-0.0127(-1.43)

ΔLPPI(-1)

4.1747(6.47)***

0.2463(3.04)**

ΔLPPI(-2)

1.4070(2.06)**

-0.2262(-2.63)**

ΔMR(-1)

-0.1069(-1.23)

-0.0104(-0.95)

ΔMR(-2)

-0.0079(-0.09)

-0.0017(-0.16)

0.0828(3.48)***

0.0050(1.66)*

TPS

-0.1348(-3.11)***

-0.0107(-1.97)**

AFC

-0.0519(-0.55)

-0.0471(-3.97)***

GFC

-0.2904(-2.87)**

-0.0196(-1.54)

FQR

-0.0859(-2.47)**

-0.0107(-1.97)**

ECMt-1

-0.5972(-7.84)***

0.0293(3.06)***

Constant

R-squared:

0.4188

0.4824

Note: 1. *, ** and *** denote 10%, 5% and 1% significance levels respectively.
2. Numbers in parentheses are t-statistics
3. Optimal lags are determined by AIC criterion

Even though the dummies variables in Table 4.4 indicates that TPS had lesser
direct impact on price compared to that of the Asian Financial dummy, however, if
there exists a positive relation between LnTRAN and LnPPI, I can still conclude that
TPS had indirectly pushed down the housing price through its impact on reducing
existing home transaction. Leung, Lau and Leong (2002) found that there is a robust
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positive correlation between price and volume while there is no clear causal relation.
The vector error correction model (VECM) is also appropriate for examining their
long run causal relationships. The coefficients of the error correction terms (ECM)
and their t-statistics are shown in Table 4.4. The ECM coefficients turn out to be
significant with positive sign when LnPPI is treated as dependent variable which
indicates that there is a positive relation between LnPPI and LnTRAN. Given that
both ECM coefficients are significant when either LnPPI or LnTRAN is treated as
dependent variable, I can conclude that there exists a bi-directional positive causality
between second hand transaction and property price.

Figure 5: Residuals from the Long Run Cointegrating Relation
for LTRAN, LPPI and MR
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4.2

Structural Break and Simulation of Housing Price
As explained above, we would expect that a structural change had occurred in

the first quarter of 1998, since the Tenants Purchase Scheme (TPS) that allowed
sitting tenants to buy their units at deep discounts was announced on 8 December
1997. I use a timing test to determine whether a structural change indeed took place
right after the announcement of the policy. In this test I identify the timing and the
magnitude of a structural break in the housing price equation. The housing price
equation is based on the assumption that the housing market was essentially in
equilibrium over the test period. When the housing market was in equilibrium,
housing prices reflect the bids from buyers which increase when their incomes rise.
I write a housing price equation with three explanatory variables: exports of goods
and services which represents the key exogenous determinant of incomes for a small
open economy, mortgage rates and consumer price.

Following Pinon-Farah (1998), and Bardhan et. al. (2003), the significance of
the key t statistic in the relevant test testifies to the existence of a structural change.
For this purpose, I now incorporate a ―timing test switching dummy variable‖(Dum)
into the model (all values being equal to zero prior quarter Q and switching to unity
for all quarters from Q is incorporated in our system. Under this test, I switch the
dummy variable (we can call this a regime shift dummy if the timing is proven
correct) from zero to unity in different quarters, and observe the changes in the
coefficients estimates and the t statistics. The intercept dummy variable ―Dum‖
would capture any shift in the relationship.

Two kinds of dummy variables—one for the intercept and one ―interactive
dummy‖—are used to capture any shift and change in the magnitudes of key
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coefficients in the relationship. I found that a structural break occurred in the first
quarter of 1998. Interestingly, this coincides with our priors, since the Tenants
Purchase Scheme—which I have reasoned will have significant structural changes on
the housing market, was announced on December 8 1997.

Table 5.1 Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test of Unit Root (Period: 1981Q1 to
2009Q3)
Variable name
Test on
No Trend
Trend
Conclusion
LnPPI

Level
1st diff

MR

Level
1st diff

LnEX

Level
1st diff

LnCPI

-1.2199
-6.4370***
-1.9481
-3.4775***
-1.9732
-4.5706***

-1.4714

I(1)

-6.4301***
-2.9910

I(1)

-3.5392**
-0.8138

I(1)

-4.9606***

Level

-0.5238

-1.6929

1st diff

-2.7463*

-1.7524

I(1)

Note: 1. 5% critical value for the augmented Dickey-Fuller tests that include constant; and constant
plus trend = 2.88 and -3.45 respectively.
2. The numbers of lags in the two unit root tests are determined by the AIC.
3. *** indicate 1% significance levels.

The ADF test results show that the null hypothesis of the relationship containing
a unit root can only be rejected when the series are first differenced. Thus the series
are all integrated of order one I(1) (see Table 5.1). Since the variables are integrated
of the same order I(1), I then employ the Johansen and Juselius procedure (1990).
The lag length of the VAR is determined by Akaike‘s Information Criterion (AIC).
As is standard, both the slope and the intercept dummy variables are treated as
exogenous I(0) variables in the co-integrating equation and the error correction
model.
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Table 5.2
Testing Cointegration between LnPPI, LnEx MR and LnCPI Using the
Johansen Procedure with Dummy Variables, 1980Q1 to 2009Q3
Explanatory
Null
Alternative
Test
Variables

Hypothesis

Hypothesis

LnPPI = f (LnEx, MR,

Trace tests:

LnCPI)

r=0

r>0

99.33***

r≦1

r>1

25.46

Trace Value

λ max Value

λ max tests:

Notes:

Statistics

r=0

r=1

73.87***

r=1

r=2

15.00

1. *** denotes significance at 1% level
2. r indicates the number of cointegrating vectors.
3. VAR = 2 is determined by AIC criterion

Table 5.3
Normalized Cointegrating Coefficients Using the Johansen Procedure
Cointegrating equation:
Coefficient
t-statistic
LnPPI = f (LnEX, MR, LnCPI)

Notes:

LnPPI

1.0000

LnEx

-0.2220

MR

0.0861

4.2026***

LnCPI

-1.4860

-3.8454***

-1.0416

1. ** and * denote significance at 5% and 10% level respectively.
2. optimal lags are determined by AIC criterion.
3. D98 and interactive dummies are treated as exogenous I(0) variables in the
cointegrating equation.

The cointegration test results for the model incorporating the most significant
dummy variables—switching to unity in the first quarter of 1998—are presented in
Table 5.2 through Table 5.5. Table 5.2 presents evidence that LnPPI is cointegrated
with the LnEX, MR and LnCPI. Table 5.3 shows that the normalized cointegrating
coefficients on LnCPI and MR carry the expected signs and are statistically
significant. The error correction model, reported in Table 5.4, showing a statistically
significant negative coefficient on the ECM term, confirms the earlier findings that
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cointegration exists between the variables.

Table 5.5 shows that the key coefficients and t statistics for models with
dummies switched on in different quarters. Readers can testify that there is an
obvious jump in the t statistic when the switch occurred in 98Q1 rather than 97Q4.
Since TPS was announced on December 8 this result is just right. The negative
coefficient on the interactive term for exports shows that exports growth no longer
provided the housing market the kind of support it used to; the positive coefficient on
the interactive term for the interest rate and consumer price show that a decline in
interest rates and increase in inflation would not provide much stimulation either.

Table 5.4 Error Correction Representation of Johansen Model
(Dependent variable:ΔLnPPIt)
Regressors
Coefficient (t-ratio)
Intercept

0.0087 (1.0519)

ΔLnPPIt-1

0.2875 (3.2681)***

ΔLnEXt-1

-0.1430 (-1.0225)

ΔMRt-1

-0.0016 (-0.3104)

ΔLnCPIt-1

1.4217 (2.2867)**

ECMt-1

-0.0476 (-3.328)***

LnEX * D98Q1

-0.6473 (-1.9818)**

MR*D98Q1

0.0169 (1.1147)

LnCPI * D98Q1

-1.8558 (-1.2015)

D98Q1

16.9556 (1.5736)

R-squared: 0.4137
Note: 1. Optimal lags are determined by AIC criterion.
2. * , ** and *** denote 10%, 5% and 1% significance levels respectively
3. Δdenotes first difference.

27

Table 5.5
A Timing Test by Switching Dummy Variables to Unity in Different Quarters
Quarter with Value of LnEX * DQ
MR * DQ
LnCPI*DQ
Intercept
Dummy Switched
Dummy DQ
to Unity
1997 Q2
-0.5366
0.0127
-1.2146
12.5513

1997 Q3

1998 Q1

1998 Q2

1998 Q3

(-1.6951)

(0.8137)

(-0.7161)

(1.1140)

-0.5632

0.1144

-1.4568

14.0150

(-1.6437)

(0.8120)

(0.7168)

(1.0615)

-0.6474

0.0169

-1.8556

16.9556

(-1.9818)**

(1.1147)

(-1.2015)

(1.5736)

-0.6061

0.0156

-1.5447

14.9773

(-1.8533)*

(1.0368)

(-1.0100)

(1.3966)

-0.3134

0.0050

0.1277

3.4326

(-0.8588)

(0.3193)

(0.0761)

(0.2859)

Note: Figures are estimated coefficients for the error correction models. t-statistics are in brackets. DQ
is a dummy variable that switches to unity in the quarter on the left column. The t statistics indicates a
structural break in 1998:Q1. The TPS was announced on December 8 1997.

As Table 5.5 shows that Dum is indeed largest and statistically most significant
when Dum=Dum98Q1, i.e., when it is switched to unity in the first quarter of 1998,
suggesting a possible structural shift in 1998 Q1. It is noteworthy that Bardhan et.
al.(2003), using a similar methodology, found no evidence that the Asian financial
crisis(AFC) had produced a structural shift in Singapore, as all timing test switch
dummy variables regardless of the quarter they are switched to unity(from 1997Q2
up to 1998Q1) were insignificant. This lends support to our argument that the
structural shift we found in Hong Kong is mainly attributed to the policy change –
viz. the TPS and not the AFC.

To further confirm the presence of a structural break in the first quarter of 1998
I conducted a Chow Test. To do this I first re-estimate the relation using the
sub-sample data before and then after(and inclusive of) the first quarter of 1998. I
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report two test statistics for the Chow Forecast test. Both the F-statistic (1.6760 with
p-value of 0.029) and log likelihood ratio (94.52 with p-value of 0.0000) rejected the
null hypothesis of no structural change in the equation before and after 1998Q1.
Therefore, I conclude that both the timing test and Chow Test provide strong support
for the hypothesis that the Tenants Purchase Scheme produced a ―regime shift‖ that
affected the housing price relationship.

Figure 6
Predicted Log of Property Price Using JH Model Incorporating Dummy
Variables Switched to Unity from 1998:quarter 1. (1998Q1-2009Q3)
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To conclude, I found a structural break that occurred in the first quarter of 1998,
which is consistent with the hypothesis that TPS caused the structural break. The
stimulative effects of exports on Hong Kong‘s housing prices were reduced
significantly from the first quarter of 1998.
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Based on the estimated error correction model reported in Table 5.4, I conduct a
dynamic forecast starting from 1998Q1 to 2009Q3. The forecasted values of LnPPI
are based on previous predicted values given the actual exports, consumer price and
mortgage rate. I have plotted the predicted values against the actual ones in the
Figure 6. Even the period of forecast values are over ten years, surprisingly, the
model tracks the actual data very well indeed. It would be interesting to find out what
might have happened to Hong Kong‘s economy if there had been no Tenants
Purchase Scheme. To do so, I set the dummy D98Q1 equals to zero, we can see that
the property price should be bottomed out in year 2000 instead of experiencing a
over seven year property downturn.

5.

Conclusions

Our empirical findings have shown that residential property price, mortgage
rates, the Asian Financial Crisis, and the implementation of the Tenants Purchase
Scheme are important determinants of the second-hand home transaction volume.
Price appreciation allows existing homeowners to trade up for better homes and
boosts confidence. Mortgage rate increases are found to have clearly dampening
effects on housing market transactions. Of particular interest is the finding that the
Tenants Purchase Scheme is found to have a significant and a greater negative effect
on the housing transactions than the Asian Financial Crisis.

During the mid-1990s, Hong Kong house prices appreciated rapidly as funds
poured in from among the richer public housing tenants. After the Asian Financial
Crisis, housing transactions had eased and house prices had slipped. At the eve of the
announcement of the TPS on 8 December 1997, home transactions in Dec
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unexpectedly plunged to new lows, and home prices began their dramatic downturn
(see Table 6).

Table 6 Monthly Transactions of Private Homes
Year/Month
First Hand Homes
Second Hand Homes
97/07
97/08
97/09
97/10
97/11
97/12
97/01-97/12
98/01
98/02
98/03
98/04
98/05
98/06
98/07
98/01-98/12
99/01
99/07
9901-9912
00/01
00/07
00/01-00/12

2,147
2,044
1,396
2,174
1,343
364
20,380
2,334
868
2,636
649
2,429
3,871
1,880
31,599
1,999
1,394
21,557
695
2,400
17,830

17,227
8,595
7,800
8,315
8,653
3,804
133,555
3,598
2,883
5,501
4,683
4,364
3,413
3,337
48,110
5,012
4,317
46,565
4,000
2,929
39,089

Source: Data provided by Centaline Property Agency Ltd.

Notwithstanding Hong Kong‘s rapid economic growth in 2000 at 10.2 per cent
home prices continued to fall, losing over 14 per cent in the year. My theory is that
this has to do with the immobilization of the existing homeowners as a result of TPS.
Because land developers from now on could only depend on first-time buyers to buy
their homes, they needed to keep reducing their asking prices in order to reach
potential buyers with a lower purchasing power. This inevitably worsened the
negative equity problem, both by dragging more homeowners into the trap and
deepening the trap. Given the huge linkage effect on the economy of the housing
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market (Case, 2000), governments pondering privatization schemes need to learn
from the experience in Hong Kong.
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Table 7.

List of Variables and their Definitions

Short Form Explanatory Variables

Sources
and
Variables

Definition

of

TRAN

Second hand home
transaction volume
(dependent variable)

Monthly volume figures are no. of
registration of transactions in
private residential properties in the
second hand market and provided
by Centaline Ltd.

PPI

Property Price Index
1989=100

Property price index

AFC

Asian Financial Crisis
Dummy

This is a non-binary dummy
variable derived from the 12-month
forward rate premium of the US
dollar on the HK dollar. It is
normalized to have a maximum
value of unity .

GFC

Global Financial Crisis
Dummy

This is a non-binary dummy
variable derived from 3 month
Treasury bill rate and the 3-month
Eurodollar rate It is normalized to
have a maximum value of unity .

TPS

Tenants Purchase Scheme

1 starting from the announcement of
the scheme in December 1997, 0
before that month (Monthly Data).

D98Q1

Dummy Variable

1 starting from the 1998 1st quarter,
0 before that quarter (Quarterly
Data)

FQR

First Quarter Effect

1 for months in the first quarter of
the year, 0 otherwise

MR

Mortgage Rate(%)

Prime rate plus 0.5% prior to 1997.
Starting from 1997 Jan, weighted
average mortgage rate from 1997 to
2009 was provided by Hong Kong
Monetary Authority.

EX

Total Exports of Goods and In million HKD (current price),
Services
seasonally adjusted

DQ

Timing Test Dummy

1 starting from the quarter tested, 0
prior to that quarter
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III. ESSAY TWO

The Nexus between Housing and the Macro Economy:
The Hong Kong Case
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1. Introduction

Expenditures on housing represent the single largest item of expenditures
for most households in any economy and a purchase that normally requires financing.
It is widely believed that housing plays an important role in the macroeconomy (Case,
2000, Goodhart and Hofmann, 2003, Cutler, 2005, Leung, 2004, Gerlach and Peng,
2005). The US subprime crisis and financial tsunami, in fact, are an outcome of the
fall in US housing price and so understanding the relation between housing market
and ―domestic consumption and investment‖ is of particular importance nowadays.
This paper considers this subject from the perspective of economic base theory and
presents some evidence for this relationship, focusing on the Hong Kong case.

Hong Kong presents a very interesting case for our investigation of the
relation between the housing market and the macro economy, both because it is a
small open economy and because it is rated as the world‘s freest economy. In 2010
Hong Kong has been the number 1 free economy in the world for the 15th
consecutive year according to the Heritage Foundation. It is known to be a very
dynamic economy, with a big population living in a small area, so that housing
represents a significant and rapidly growing component of wealth for its homeowners.
Yet shortly after the Asian Financial Crisis, the Hong Kong economy shrank by 5.5
per cent in 1998. In Hong Kong‘s history negative economic growth for the entire
year is unprecedented. With many economies around the world still enjoying and
apparently benefiting from a housing boom, there is a need for greater understanding
of the relation between housing and the macro economy.
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Table 1.

Private Consumption during Two Crises
Asian Financial Crisis

Quarter

Global Financial Tsunami

HK$

%

million

Change

Quarter

HK$

%

million

Change

(year on

(year on

year)

year)

97 Q4

205,555

2.3

08 Q3

252,033

0.7

98 Q1

184,847

-1.9

08 Q4

256,996

-3.2

98 Q2

186,143

-4.0

09 Q1

238,438

-6.2

98 Q3

184,073

-8.2

09 Q2

257,936

-0.6

98 Q4

189,678

-7.7

09 Q3

253,433

0.6

99 Q1

177,669

-3.9

09 Q4

269,261

4.8

99 Q2

188,476

1.3

10 Q1

253,886

6.5

Source: Hong Kong Monthly Digest of Statistics, Census & Statistics Dept of HKSAR, various
years.

Table 2.

Gross Domestic Fixed Capital Formation during Two Crises
Asian Financial Crisis

Quarter

Global Financial Tsunami

HK$

%

million

Change

Quarter

HK$

%

million

Change

(year on

(year on

year)

year)

98 Q1

80,864

-1.0

08 Q3

85,871

4.1

98 Q2

87,439

1.9

08 Q4

74,029

-16.7

98 Q3

74,339

-11.7

09 Q1

76,948

-10.3

98 Q4

73,756

-18.8

09 Q2

78,012

-11.8

99 Q1

65,774

-18.7

09 Q3

88,585

3.2

99 Q2

66,085

-24.4

99 Q4

84,470

14.1

99 Q3

65,536

-11.8

10 Q1

85,054

10.5

99 Q4

65,993

-10.5

00 Q1

66,809

1.6

Source: Hong Kong Monthly Digest of Statistics, Census & Statistics Dept of HKSAR, various
years.
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As mentioned in the first paper, the Hong Kong economy had suffered under
both the Asian Financial Crisis in 1997 and the Global Financial Tsunami in 2008. In
the exports sector and stock market which are both more sensitive to external shocks,
Hong Kong‘s exports and stock market fell much more in the wake of the global
financial tsunami. However, the declines in domestic sector including private
consumption and gross investment had lessened in 2008 financial tsunami and the
rebounds have appeared to be much stronger after the crisis (see Table 1 and 2). I
argued that a much better performance in property market in 2008/09 should play a
significant role in making the domestic sector more stable and enhancing the
rebounds.

In comparing the performance of domestic sectors under the two crises, there
are some interesting questions that deserve study. What accounts for the strength in
the Hong Kong housing market ahead of 1997, and what accounts for the major
decline after? If recessions would cause a fall in property market, why we did not see
a more dramatic drop in property price in 2008 crisis? Does it imply that the housing
market should drive domestic private expenditures (defined as domestic private
consumption plus domestic fixed capital formation)? Or do domestic private
expenditures drive housing prices? What are the causal directions? I will attempt to
answer these questions, presenting statistical evidence to support my arguments.

Many commentators attributed the housing price surge ahead of the handover of
sovereignty to a provision in the Annex to the Sino-British Joint Declaration, which
restricted the annual land grant to no more than 50 hectares (excluding land granted
to the Hong Kong Housing Authority for the construction of public rental housing)
unless a relaxation to the limit is approved by the Land Commission consisting of
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equal number of members from the British and Chinese sides9 (Peng & Wheaton,
1994). Yet a comparison of the number of households and the number of dwelling
units indicates that the housing market was essentially in balance during the run-up
to the handover: housing prices appeared to be rising in a moving equilibrium—with
supply and demand being equalized even as price change. This is much like the
rising wages and salaries witnessed in a growing economy.

2. Theory

I will follow the tradition of viewing a small open economy as comprising a
basic sector that is trade-oriented, and a non-basic sector that owes its existence to
and services the basic sector. A small open economy has to export in order to finance
its imports, which are necessary for its survival. The exports sector, then, is the
driver of the economy, while the ―non-basic‖ or domestic sector spins off economic
benefits throughout the economy. It is, however, typical that the basic sector can only
provide a limited number of employment opportunities. The majority of workers
have to work in the non-basic sector. Thus, earnings from the basic sector must be
spent in the economy in order to create additional jobs. Housing happens to be the
largest single item of expenditures that employers and employees in the basic sector
can spend on. What is more important, housing as an industry also has much greater
domestic value added content than many other industries. Even though modern
housing construction may rely increasingly on imported prefabricated components
the construction has to take place on a plot of land. It is largely through the building

9

See http://www.hkbu.edu.hk/~pchksar/JD/jd-full1.htm

In practice Hong Kong had released more

than 50 hectares per year every year since the Sino-British Joint Declaration took effect in 1984.
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erected on a plot of land that the latter can realize its locational rent. In a sense, then
it is housing that confers a plot of land its rent. When housing prices rise, small and
medium businesses will also become better able to obtain loans to finance their
business operations (Chen, 2001). Thus it is postulated that for a small open
economy housing serves as the principal transmission mechanism and the linkage
between the basic sector and the non-basic sector, or perhaps more accurately
between the basic sector and the rest of non-basic sector other than housing, since
housing is certainly an important component in the non-basic sector. It is, of course,
also possible that instead of, or in addition to trade, capital inflows, particularly FDI,
may also provide the non-basic sector the ―fuel‖ for growth, even though much of
FDI may target at the exports markets10. But these capital inflows would also benefit
the housing sector before it benefits the rest of the non-basic sector.

In comparison, for a large, relatively closed economy the role of housing is
expected to be smaller. There is hardly a distinction between the basic sector and the
non-basic sector, as the economy is relatively self-sufficient. In addition to housing,
there are also many other forms of assets that can serve as a store of value for income
earners—with the result that housing becomes relatively less important.

Under this hypothesis, the run-up in housing prices in Hong Kong before 1997
is very much a result of strong exports, although it is also pushed up by speculative
activities and by a deliberate policy to drive out richer public housing tenants onto
the private market. Following the Asian Financial Crisis, Hong Kong‘s exports
suffered a decline. According to the same logic as described this would have led to a

10

Chou and Wong (2002) found that trade and foreign direct investment effects account for
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decline in housing prices any way. But the decline has been further aggravated by
two other policies: a policy to lure sitting tenants, including the richer ones, to buy
their own units rather than from the private market, which severed the ―housing
ladder‖ of households trading up to better and more costly homes, and a policy to
increase housing supply to a target of 85,000 units a year. This part‘s focus is
however NOT about this story, but about the effects of the housing market collapse
on the macro economy, and about the macroeconomic effect of exports growth on
housing prices in a small open economy.

In this paper, I hypothesize that housing plays the unique role of a bridge
between the basic sector and the non-basic sector. In particular, I hypothesize that
exports, apart from providing employment and incomes, will push up housing prices.
As housing prices move up, a range of other activities will benefit. Expenditures on
housing represent the single largest item of expenditures for most households in any
economy. Expenditures on housing purchases, in particular, amount to many years of
income. That is why financing is very important. Few individuals or households
would commit years of incomes to servicing the loan for acquiring any asset other
than housing. Because of the leverage involved, capital gains from housing
potentially generate sizable returns to the initial investment. On the basis of such
capital gains, an entrepreneur can usually refinance the home and obtain a much
larger loan to support his business project. So residential housing also indirectly
allows many potential entrepreneurs realize their dreams. Increases in house prices
enhance the collateral available to homeowners in form of equity withdrawal by
remortgage their unit and thereby facilitating higher consumption or investment

approximately 44% of the growth in Hong Kong.
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(Aoki et al., 2001)

Yet the view that housing prices would boost consumption and domestic
demand has not been unchallenged. For example, it is argued that heavier mortgage
payments resulting from higher housing prices may displace consumption
expenditures (Glaeser, 2000). Miles (1994) argues that increases in house price
would hurt those existing owners who want to trade up and also the first time buyers
(existing renters) as increase in home prices would lead to increase their saving for
down payment and thereby reducing their consumption. (Campbell and Cocco, 2007).
Therefore, the positive wealth effect on consumption could be offset by increase in
saving by those owners who want to trade up and first time buyers.

In Hong Kong, 53.1% of total number of domestic households in 2010 own
their homes (including private housing, subsidized sales flats and TPS units), and this
figure has remained very stable from 1999 to 2010—representing a change from the
previous increasing trend, and the household formation is around 30,000 each year
sharing just about 1 % of the total number of households in Hong Kong (General
Household Survey, various years, Censes & Statistics Dept of HKSAR). Also, 30.1%
of households who reside in public rental housing receiving heavy subsidy form the
government are not affected by the increase in housing price. Only 13.1% of
households are tenants of private housing. The net impacts on domestic demand
arising from the wealth effect and saving effect from renters as a result of the
increase in housing price remains an empirical question and the results would vary
across countries with different demographic profiles, saving and consumption
patterns.
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An important and extremely robust result of the current paper is that domestic
private sector expenditures is always driven by the housing price index and not vice
versa. The dramatic decline in housing prices appears to be a major reason behind the
sharp decline of the economy and the deflation that began in August 1998(cf. Cutler,
2005).

Section 2 will provide some background to the Hong Kong housing market and
highlight some key policy changes that happened in the 1990s. Section 3 will present
the results of empirical tests under a VAR framework. I identified two cointegrating
relations among the variables Housing Price Index(LnPPI), Total Exports(LnEX),
Mortgage Rate(MR), and Private Domestic Demand(LnDD),and found that
restrictions consistent with our prior assumptions cannot be rejected. Variance
decomposition and impulse response functions indicate that indeed exports is the key
driving variable for housing price, while housing price is the key driving variable for
private domestic demand. Section 4 will provide the conclusions.

2. Hong Kong‟s Housing Market and Policies

Public housing has traditionally played a key role in Hong Kong‘s housing
market. To deal with the rapidly expanding population, Governor MacLehose
announced in October 1972 an unprecedented public housing programme.
Seventy-two public housing estates were to be constructed, to provide decent
housing to a total of 1.8 million people. These estates offered cheap rents to qualified
means-tested households. Then in 1978, the Home Ownership Scheme (HOS) was
launched, offering an opportunity for those who were not qualified for low cost
rental housing to buy their own flats at prices much lower than private flats. Most
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buyers of HOS housing were public rental tenants, who were given a more favorable
quota than other eligible buyers over the limited supply of new HOS flats.

Hong Kong‘s housing prices slumped following the dramatic interest rate spike
of 1980-81 and in the face of political uncertainty over Hong Kong‘s future. With the
signing of the Sino-British Joint Declaration in 1984 removing much of the political
uncertainty, Hong Kong‘s housing prices began to climb spectacularly. Particularly
after 1987, following the implementation of a policy to make the richer public
housing tenants pay higher rent, participation among public housing tenants in the
housing market rose. A priori, one would predict that this inflow of cash into the
housing market would drive housing prices as well as housing transactions up. By
1992/93, it was found that 13 per cent of public housing tenants owned a flat and as
much as 24 per cent of housing transactions were due to purchase by public housing
tenants(Hong Kong Housing Authority,1993).

With housing prices surging ahead, a Task Force on Land Supply and Property
Prices was set up in 1994. Finding that 10% of sale and purchase agreements
presented for stamping between February 1992 and March 1994 involved short-term
re-sales—which was considered prima facie evidence for speculative activities, the
Task Force recommended a series of anti-speculation measures in June. Among such
measures, the initial deposit was to be fixed at 10% of the purchase price and 5%
would be forfeited if the purchaser fails to sign the formal sale and purchase
agreement or enters into a Cancellation Agreement with the developer. Stamp duties
were also made payable at the time a provisional sale and purchase agreement was
signed and not at the time the transaction was completed.
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Apart from worrying about speculation, the government also had worried over
the homeownership rate. In 1987, The Long Term Housing Strategy: A Policy
Statement already made it clear that the government wanted to encourage home
ownership. The Tenants Purchase Scheme(TPS), announced in December 1997, was
a way to boost the homeownership rate. Offering tenants as much as 88 % off the
estimated market values and allowing them to resell after two years, the TPS was
attractive and was to play a strategic role in Mr. Tung Chee-hwa‘s vision of
increasing homeownership from 50% to 70% in ten years, as announced in his first
policy address of October 1997.

Unfortunately, the scheme‘s success meant a sudden loss of attractiveness of
Home Ownership Scheme flats, which suddenly looked ridiculously expensive in
comparison11. For the first time ever, HOS homeowners found a dearth of buyers.
Turnover in the second-hand market dropped precipitously, and developers had to
by-pass existing homeowners in order to find buyers (Ho, et.al. 2005). After they
have exhausted one ―crop‖ of buyers, they must further cut prices in order to reach
buyers with lower purchasing power.

In an attempt to boost homeownership Mr.Tung in 1997 announced a new
policy of increasing the supply of homes to 85000 units a year (from an average of
about 53,000 units a year over the 1987-1997 period). From 1998 on through late

11

For this hypothesis to carry weight, public housing tenants have to be active in the housing market

prior to the announcement of the TPS. This was vindicated as a survey by the Housing Authority in
1992/93 found that public housing tenants were responsible for 24 per cent of housing transactions.
Watanabe(1998) found public housing tenants had huge savings compared to private housing tenants
or owners.
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1999 the government used every means within its control to boost housing supply12.
The increased supply began to hit the market around late 2000. In late 2002, in order
to stabilize the housing market, new measures were implemented including cessation
of the production and sale of HOS, PSPS flats as well as the sale of PRH flats under
the TPS after phase 6 will cease from 2003 onwards

4.

Housing Price Determination in a Small Open Economy and the Exports
Multiplier on Domestic Economy

4.1 Economic Base Theory
In principle, many factors determine housing prices, and they include both
demand side and supply side factors. These factors include demographic variables,
incomes, interest rates, mortgage loan ratios, and expectations about inflation,
expectations about supply and income trends, and the completion rate, etc. If supply
and all other factors are given, however, housing prices will simply rise with incomes
and decline with the interest rate. In general, when the policy environment is stable,
and when the housing market is more or less in equilibrium, incomes and interest
rates would be the predominant factors driving housing prices.

Following the economic base theory, in a small open economy incomes are
closely tied to exports. Exports, apart from interest rates, is then a key factor driving
housing prices. If exports are the main driving force behind a small open economy‘s
incomes, and if this initial income increase translates into demand for housing, then

12

Mr. Tung in an interview with reporters in June 2000 unexpectedly made the statement that the
85000 a year production target was no longer government policy. Earlier on, a story in Apple
Daily(July 6, 1999) reported that land lease conversions and land exchange in the first half of the year
would provide 16785 housing units, a new record in recent history. Plot ratios were also increased
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there are three effects on domestic consumption and domestic investment. There is
first the direct multiplier effect working through developers‘ construction
expenditures and payments of land premiums to the government (the ―basic sector‖
O‘Sullivan, 2003, pp.120-122.). There is also a second order effect working through
the wealth effect as the prices of housing rise (Cutler, 2005). The third effect is
through the credit channel. Many small and medium enterprises obtain their
financing of their business activities through borrowing, and the rise in the collateral
value of housing boosts borrowing.(Gerlach and Peng, 2005)

Thus, I have a recursive model with an ―exports multiplier‖ linking exports to
domestic demand. The housing market provides a ―transmission mechanism‖
whereby the ―growth engine‖ of the economy, i.e., exports, gives rise to the
secondary effects of ―non-basic‖ sector activities through various input-output
relationships.

These relations can be summarized by the following equations:

LnPPI = α1 + β1LnEX + γMR + εt
(β1>0, γ<0 and λ > 0)

-------------------- [1]

LnDD = α2 + β2 LnPPI +εt
(β2>0)

--------------------[2]

where PPI is the property(housing) price index, EX is total exports, DD is
domestic demand and MR is mortgage rate.

[1] is a reduced form equation collapsing the effects of supply and demand

over the years.
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assuming the housing market is in moving equilibrium over time. While most authors
use income--in particular GDP--growth as the key driving variable for housing prices
(Tsatsaronis, Kostas and Haibin Zhu, 2004, Phillips and Goodstein, 2000) I prefer to
focus only on exports because exports is exogenous.

In contrast, measures such as

the GDP include consumption and will be affected by housing prices.13

Equation [2] depicts private domestic demand as solely dependent on home
prices, which is obviously too simplistic to be a theory to explain private domestic
demand. The simplified specification, however, is intended to highlight the recursive
nature of the key variables, and does not portend that variables such as government
expenditures, interest rates, and current incomes do not play a role in determining
private domestic demand.

This study employs quarterly data from 1984 to 2004. This is a period with a
stable monetary regime as well as a period of relative political stability after the
signing of the Sino-British Joint Declaration removing much of the uncertainty about
Hong Kong future. Figure 1 – 4 show the movements of the four key variables. For
the source and definition of variables that are analyzed, see Appendix 1.

4.2 Empirical Results
a. Test Results for Unit Roots
I begin the estimation by testing the stationary properties of the variables using

13

Tsatsaronis and Zhu(2004) used the structural vector autoregression approach and regressed each

variable on a number of lags of all endogenous variables, which include: house price inflation, the
growth rate of GDP, the real short-term interest rate, the term spread, inflation and the growth rate of
real bank credit to the private sector.

Ours is a simpler approach but essentially capture similar
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the Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF). The following equation is estimated for each
of the time series:
k

ΔX t =α 0 +α1t +βX t 1 +∑δ i ΔX t i +η t
i =1

where Δ is the first difference operator, t is the time trend, k denotes the
number of lags used and  is the error term. The null hypothesis that series X is
non-stationary can be rejected if  is statistically significant with negative sign. The
optimal lag k, is chosen by the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC). Table 3 shows
that the test statistics for all the series in level form and in their first differences,
respectively. The fact that the null hypothesis of unit root cannot be rejected when
the series are in level but can be rejected when the series are in first differences
clearly indicates that all the series in the system are integrated of order one, and
therefore no further unit root tests are performed.

b. Test Results for Cointegration
Since the variables are integrated of order one I(1), the next step is to carry out
co-integration analyses of the variables. I first identify the long-run relationship
among our variables by using the Johansen procedure. I chose the lag structure by
using the Akaike‘s Information Criterion (AIC), which determines VAR=2. The
cointegration test results are presented in Table 4. The number of co-integrating
vectors r is determined by reference to the λmax and the trace statistics. As can be
seen, the trace value indicate that there are two cointegrating vectors (r = 2) among
the four variables at 5% significant level while λ max indicates only one
cointegrating relation. Based on the results, r=2 was chosen for the VECM model.

variables, except that we used exports rather than GDP.
48

Table 3. Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test of Unit Root (1984Q1 to 2009Q4 )
Variable name
Test on
No Trend
Trend
Conclusion
LnPPI

Level
1st diff

-1.2218
-6.2372***

-1.5239
-6.2302***

I(1)

LnEX

Level
1st diff

-2.7314*
-5.2713***

-1.0878
-5.9228***

I(1)

LnDD

Level
1st diff

-2.3716
-3.4821***

-1.0059
-4.9843***

I(1)

MR

Level
1st diff

-1.9483
-10.9872***

-2.9910
-10.946***

I(1)

Note:
1.
5% critical value for the augmented Dickey-Fuller tests that include constant; and constant plus
trend = -2.8861. and -3.4480 respectively.
2.
The numbers of lags in the two unit root tests are determined by the AIC
3.
*** and * indicates 1% and 10% significance level respectively.

Table 4. Johansen Cointegrating Test Result (1984Q1 to 2009Q4)
Variables

LnPPI, LnEX,
LnDD, MR

Null

Alternative

Test

0.05

Hypothesis

Hypothesis

Statistics

Critical Value

r>0
r>1
r>2

Trace Value
58.55****
31.17**
14.78*

Trace Value
47.86
29.79
15.49

λ max tests:
r=0

r=1

λ max Value
27.38*

λ max Value
27.58

r=1
r=2

r=2
r=3

Trace tests:
r=0
r≦1
r≦2

16.39
11.32

21.13
14.26

Notes:
1.
*** and ** denotes significance at 1% and 5% level respectively
2.
Test assumption: No linear deterministic trend in the data
3.
r indicates the number of cointegrating vectors.
4.
VAR = 2 is determined by AIC criterion.

Having determined that the number of cointegrating vectors r = 2, the next step
is to identify the cointegrating vectors and to test if the restrictions suggested by our
theoretical model(i.e. excluding domestic demand from the first cointegrating
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equation, and the total exports and prime rate from the second cointgrating equation)
are statistically acceptable.

Table 5. Normalized Long-run Cointegrating Coefficients & Test of Restrictions
LnPPI
LnEX
LnDD
MR
Relation 1
Relation 2

1
-0.7561***

-1.9004***
(-7.4452)
0

0
1

0.0461**
(2.0272)
0

(-16.4560)
Test of cointegration restrictions:
H0= β13 = 0, and β22 = β24 = 0
LR Test: χ2 = 1.25637, p-value = 0.2623
Notes:

1.
2.

*** denotes significance at 1% level.
Numbers in parentheses are t-statistics.

The estimated cointegrating equations and the results on test of restrictions are
reported in the Table 5. The test on cointegration restrictions, as explained in
Boswijk (1996), is a log-likelihood ratio (LR) test with a chi-squared distribution. If
the test statistics is high (i.e. p<0.05), then the LR test rejects the imposed restrictions.
The LR static to our restrictions (i.e. Ho: β13 = 0, and β22 = β24 = 0) is 1.0747 with a
P-value of 0.2999. Therefore, our restrictions are accepted and so our prior
hypotheses are not rejected.

The first cointegrating vector suggests there is a positive relation between
property price and exports, and a negative relation between property price and
mortgage rate. The second vector suggests a positive relationship between property
price and private domestic demand. As Table 5 shows, all the variables carry the
expected signs and in particular the coefficients for LnPPI (in CoinEq 2) and LnEX
(in CoinEq 1) are significant at 1% level. The above estimation implies the following
VEC model:

50

LnPPI

 1,1 

1, t 1

t

 1 

 1, 2 

2 , t 1

LnPPI   LnDD   LnEX
           (3)

t i

1

2

t 1

2

1, t 1

2 ,1

t i

1

2 , t 1

2, 2

2

t 1

3

3

1, t 1

3,1

t i

1

2 , t 1

3, 2

4 ,1

4

1,t 1

Table 6.

1

4, 2

t 1



2 , t 1

2

t 1

3

t 1



4

MR

t 1



4,t

t i

  2 LnDDt 1   3 LnEX t 1   4 MRt 1 
          ( 6)

Vector Error Correction Model Estimation
Dependent Variable:

ECM 1 (-1)
ECM 2 (-1)
D(LnPPI(-1))
D(LnEX(-1))
D(LnDD(-1))
D(MR(-1))
Constant

  4 MRt 1 

MR

3, t
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t

t 1

4

2 ,t

LnEX     LnPPI   LnDD   LnEX
 
 
           (5)

t



1, y

LnDD    LnPPI  LnDD  LnEX
 
 
           ( 4)

t

t 1

3

D(LnPPI)

D(LnDD)

-0.0855
(-2.7659)**
0.0113
(0.1648)
0.3703
(3.3620)**
-0.3175
(-1.6668)*

-0.0331
(-2.7221)**
-0.0751
(-2.7759)**
0.1268
(2.9232)**
0.0302
(0.4025)

0.3553
(1.1946)
-0.0020
(-0.3274)
0.1774
(3.3957)***

-0.0008
(-0.0074)
0.0031
(1.2803)
0.0689
(3.3476)***

Notes:
1. ***, ** and * denotes significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively.
2. Numbers in parentheses are t-statistics.
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where γ1 and γ2 are the error correction term (cointegrating vectors estimated in
the Table 5), and θ1 and θ2 are the adjustment coefficients. The VEC model is
reported in Table 6. The cointegrating vectors indicate a stable long-run relationship
among the variables and the coefficients associated with the error correction term
indicate the direction and speed of adjustment of each variable in the system towards
its long-rum equilibrium.

c. Granger Causality between Housing Price and Domestic Private Demand
I now test the direction of causality between domestic private demand and
housing prices. Based on the equations (3) and (4), the short-run causal relation
between the variables can be investigated by applying a Waldχ2-test of the joint
significance of the lags of other explanatory variables in the equation. As far as our
focus is concerned, the null hypotheses being tested are: H0: σ1= 0 and H0 β2= 0.
The results of temporal Granger causality test is shown in the Table 714. Clearly, only
the null hypothesis of LnPPI does not Granger-cause LnDD is rejected at 5%
significance level. Therefore, based on the result, I conclude that the direction of
causality only runs from LnPPI to LnDD but not the other way round.15
Table 7. Temporal Granger Causality Test Result
Dep. Variable
Null Hypothesis

Prob

DLnDD

LnPPI does not cause LnDD

8.5448

0.0035***

DLnPPI

LnDD does not cause LnPPI

1.4271

0.2322

Notes:

14

Chi-sq

1. *** denotes significance at 1%.

2. D denotes first difference

Diagnostic tests (test on serial correlation and normality) indicate well-behaved residuals. For

space consideration, the results are not reported here but are available upon request.
15

It should be noted that the Granger causality test does not by itself establish any causal relationship.

It does, however, provide a test to falsify any hypothesized causal relationship.

Our test results are
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d. Results of Variance Decompositions and Impulse Responses
The above analysis provides evidence on the existence of long-run cointegrating
relations among the variables and also of a short-run casual relation between the
property price and domestic demand. To provide a more comprehensive analysis of
causal relationship (both in short run and long run) and dynamic properties of the
model, the variance decomposition and impulse response analysis will be conducted
in this section.

Impulse response functions show the response paths of each endogenous
variable to a one-time shock (=one standard deviation) to other variables in the
system. As far as our research focus is concerned, I am interested in the response of
housing price and domestic demand to shocks in other variables.

Figure 1 shows

the response of housing price to one standard deviation shocks in LnEX, MR, LnDD
and the housing price itself.16 It indicates that there is a positive effect of LnEX on
the LnPPI and a negative effect of MR on LnPPI. Figure 2 plots the response of
domestic demand to various shocks. As can be seen, domestic demand increases
sharply during the first three quarters following a shock in the housing price and this
impact will then weaken over a longer time horizon. The figure also confirms that the
domestic demand responds positively to a shock in exports and negatively to a shock
in interest rate.

To assess the relative importance of these shocks, I then carry the variance
decomposition analysis. This shows the proportion of the variance of the forecast
error for each variable that is attributed to shocks (one standard deviation innovation)

consistent with the hypothesized causal directions.
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to each endogenous variable in the system including its own. Table 8 reports the
results of variance decompositions for LnDD and LnPPI with a 16 quarter (4 years)
horizon (also see Figure 3 and 4). I do not report the results for LnEX and PR as the
variations in these two variables are largely explained by their own innovations
(more than 70 percent).

As can be seen in the Table 8(A) and Figure 3, the LnPPI forecast error variance
(FEV) is dominated by movement in itself in the short run (about 90%), while it
declines over a longer horizon. In the long run (about 4 years), about 18 percent of
the forecast error variance of LnPPI can be explained by shocks in LnEX and LnDD
respectively.

Figure 1. Impulse Response of LnPPI to One Standard Deviation Shocks
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The results are insensitive to different ordering of the variables.
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Figure 2. Impulse Response of LnDD to One Standard Deviation Shocks
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Figure 3. Variance Decomposition of LnPPI
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Figure 4. Variance Decomposition of LnDD
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Table 8. Variance Decomposition Analysis
Period

LnPPI

LnDD

LnEX

MR

0.00
0.76
4.07
10.25
17.43

0.00
0.20
3.70
11.13
18.48

0.00
1.49
5.06
8.15
9.65

78.38
50.30
42.65
42.20
43.91

0.00
1.85
7.45
14.83
21.34

0.00
0.32
2.70
5.32
6.94

A) Variance decomposition of LnPPI (%)
1
4
8
12
16

100.00
97.53
87.16
70.47
54.44

B) Variance Decomposition of LnDD(%)
1
4
8
12
16

21.62
47.53
47.20
37.66
27.81

For the LnDD (see Table 8(B) and Figure 84, interestingly, the proportion of
variance explained by the LnPPI increases sharply during the 1-5 quarters from about

56

20% to 50% and then declines gradually afterward but still remains at around 30% in
the long run. The MR shock is almost no effect on explaining the FEV of LnDD in
the short run while it gains importance in longer time horizon. After 20 quarters later,
it can explain about 7% of the FEV of the LnDD. Exports also explains a large
proportion of FEV of LnDD (from below 10 percent in the short term and then up to
above 20 percent after 16 quarters).

These results indicates that property price has a strong and immediate impact on
domestic demand in short run and it also supports our earlier findings that there is a
short term unidirectional causality from property price to domestic demand. Besides,
Hong Kong as a small and open economy, our analysis supports the argument that
external sector - export in Hong Kong has generated significant positive impacts on
property price and domestic demand in both the medium and the longer run.

4.

Conclusions

This paper has thrown light on an interesting role of the housing market in the
economic base model. In a small open economy exports serves as the ―economic
base‖ so that when exports grow the simulative effects are transmitted to the
domestic economy and then generate second and higher order spending effect.

In

this process the housing market appears to play a crucial role. If the housing market
for some reason suddenly fails to draw capital or to retain capital in the domestic
economy, it is difficult to think of a substitute that could play a similar role.

Using Hong Kong data I have presented a statistical model that clearly indicates
the effects of exports on housing prices and the crucial effects of housing prices on
57

domestic private spending. In Hong Kong, roughly 50-55% of all households living
in private flats or subsidized sales flats own their homes, and this figure has remained
very stable from 1999 to 2009.

This is not a particularly high figure in the

developed world, suggesting that the effects of housing on domestic private spending
are likely to be quite significant in countries like the US or the UK.

I have presented evidence that housing prices are one of the driving forces
behind growth in domestic consumption and spending in the non-basic sectors in
general, including gross fixed capital investment. This does not, however, imply that
the government should try to manipulate housing prices. When housing prices surge
and there is worry about the formation of a bubble, it is important not to be tempted
to artificially boost supply and thus cool down the market. If people pay too high a
price and if prices subsequently decline, they will only have themselves to blame.
Governments should always aim only at keeping supply close to the long run level of
demand
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Table 9.

List of Variables and their Definitions

Short form

Description

Data Sources

LnDD

Log of domestic private spending = Hong Kong Census and
Log of (Private Consumption + Private Statistics Dept
construction + Machinery & Equipment
(Private)), current price, seasonally
adjusted using X11 from Eview
Programme

LnEX

Log total exports of goods and Hong Kong Census and
services , current price, seasonally Statistics Dept
adjusted using X11 from Eview
Programme

LnPPI

Log property price index (overall Hong Kong Monthly Digest
private domestic housing market) of Statistics, Hong Kong
1989=100
Census and Statistics Dept

MR

Mortgage Rate(%)

Prime rate plus 0.5% prior to
1997. Starting from 1997
Jan,
weighted
average
mortgage rate from 1997 to
2009 was provided by Hong
Kong Monetary Authority.
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IV. ESSAY THREE

Supply and Demand Dynamics of Private Housing Market
in Hong Kong

.
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1.

Introduction

This paper attempts to investigate the supply and demand dynamics of private
housing market in Hong Kong. Many empirical researches on housing market are
traditionally based on the assumption that market is almost in equilibrium status.
Nevertheless, we can observed that housing market is more often in disequilibrium as
reflected by asymmetric price movement where owners tend to hold a reservation
price during the cold market and slow response of supply during excess demand.
Using the cointegarting approach, the paper identifies two cointegrating relations, ie.
a long run demand side relation between property price, prime rate, per capita GDP,
expectation and private housing stock, and supply side relation between private
housing completion, property price, and land cost, which shows a short run
disequilibrium dynamics in demand and supply of private housing during 1984 –
2008. Private housing price and supply adjust slowly to shocks would produce
disequilibrium effects. Impulse response and variance decomposition are employed
to shed light on the dynamics structure in the VECM model. The finding also
indicates that the foreseeable supply level of private housing would have a positive
impact on current price expectation. A predictable future housing supply would
therefore help to stabilize potential home buyer‘s price expectation. The paper is
divided into five sections. Section two discusses the sources of inefficiency in the
private housing market and reviews literature. Section three develops the model used
in this paper to explain the demand and supply adjustments of private housing market
in Hong Kong. The empirical findings and policy recommendations on implementing
a production target and subsidized sales flats are reported on Section four. Finally,
Section five offers conclusions.
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2. Costly Search, Reservation Demand, Inelastic Supply and Adjustment

In many empirical studies of the housing market, the model assumes that supply
and demand factors would interact simultaneously to determine the price level that
clears the market. However, the spontaneous market clearing that equilibrates
―turnover supply‖ with ―turnover demand‖ does not imply equilibrium in terms of
longer term demand and longer term supply responses. The market price typically
informs, along with earlier market prices and other market information, both the
supply and the demand side and generally triggers further adjustments. First, there
are several features of housing market which leads to delayed responses from both
supply side and demand side. In particular, quality heterogeneity compounds the
imperfect information problem to cause potential buyers to spend time in searching
for a unit and owners are also subject to time cost for searching a buyer who may
offer a higher price. Typically search characterize both buyers and sellers, as a result
of which vacant homes waiting for buyers may exist even though the price ―clears
the market‖ in some sense. At the market price some home sellers may decide to
keep their homes and continue to look for better offers. In other words there is a
―reservation demand‖ from the owners themselves that balances out with the
apparent excess supply in the form of vacancy.

Every housing unit in the market is unique in terms of quality, decoration,
high/low floor, views, developers, location, etc. Given the uniqueness of each
housing unit, price discovery is not as efficient as might be thought. In other words it
is very difficult and time consuming for owners to obtain an accurate fair market
price for their property. Sellers want to get the best price and search for the highest
bidder, and the amount of time of this search is a key decision variable that is related
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to the perceived marginal cost of search and the expected marginal benefit. Property
developers have lots of units to be sold in the market and therefore they soon notice
any difference in the speed at which the units are selling, and thus can respond with a
price change quickly. Unlike a property developer, most sellers would only have one
or two units to sell and they are also relatively inexperienced. If the market slows
down, they may not be aware of it, and thus tends to be slow in revising the asking
price. Leung (2006) recognized that fact that the uniqueness of housing unit and little
experience selling for most home owners would produce price dispersion in the
residential property market. The same is true for buyers who may have little
experience buying, especially for first time buyers. They want to look for the better
deal, and tend to extend their search time as long as the perceived benefit of search is
higher than the cost. Different perceptions of these costs and benefits lead to
divergent search time and possibly divergent offering prices. A higher price
dispersion would induce owners and potential buyers to search further thereby
increasing the natural vacancy rates.

Home owners who want to sell a unit face a trade-off between higher expected
price offer and longer expected time to sell. The owner may hold a unit vacant in
search for a buyer who is willing to pay a higher price. While buyers also take time
to compare the price and quality of all available units for sale in the market. Both
sides do not have perfect information of all available potential buyers and all
available units for sale. The owners may be able to gain information by searching the
market or depending on property agents. If the reservation price is set at a relative
high level, the search time for a buyer would increase significantly in terms of longer
expected time to sale. Novy-Marx (2009) pointed out that in the markets
characterized by costly search, price is not the only variable that adjusts to clear
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markets. A positive demand shock will bring more buyers to the markets, improving
the relative position of sellers, who then can meet potential buyers more frequently,
reducing the expected time to sale.

In the supply side, it is commonly believed that housing supply is fixed (or very
inelastic) in short run. When there is a sudden increase in demand, the price will go
up to clear the excess demand. The higher price for housing will then induce property
developers to supply more housing units to the market as it becomes more profitable
(long run supply is more elastic). However, developers production decision is not
only based on current housing price level and current production costs but also on
expected future price at which a flat will be sold, land availability for housing
development and ability to expand production. It may take several years for the
supply to adjust adequately to the price changes.

Under these conditions, it is possible for housing prices to overshoot upward in
the short run (deviated from its long run equilibrium path) when there is a sudden
increase in housing demand. In the longer term, property developers gradually react
to the increase in profitability and therefore a much greater supply of housing units is
forthcoming, it is therefore entirely possible that housing price will overshoot
(downward) again at the time when the new supply flows into the market in the
longer term. The end result is that housing market is often characterized by sustained
periods of disequilibrium. Although price ups and downs guide the market toward
new equilibrium, the failure of supply to adjust efficiently to price changes seems to
be an important source of disequilibrium thereby generating boom and bust cycle in
the housing market. In case of Hong Kong where land is scarce and residential units
are largely produced in form of high-rise building, the time lag for supply to catch up
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with demand appears to be very difficult.

3. Theoretical Considerations

The housing market has both a flow dimension and a stock dimension. New
investment, the flow dimension, is the sum of construction of new housing units and
depreciation of existing units. The long-run supply, or stock of housing, is the
accumulation of the new investment. DiPasquale and Wheaton (1994, 1996) develop
a stock-flow model and define the long-run equilibrium stock to be a function of
price and a vector of cost-shifting variables (e.g. construction cost, land prices,
interest rate). Housing demand theory defines the equilibrium demand for the current
stock of housing as a function of price and a set of demand variables such as income,
interest rate. The traditional assumption in the stock-flow model is that markets clear
quickly and that prices adjust instantaneously to equate the demand for housing with
the existing stock (see equation [1]). Where P is the housing price and X1 is the
demand side variables such as interest rate, tax, income. P* in equation [1] is the
equilibrium prices that bring supply and demand in equilibrium. Equation [2]
indicates a price adjustment mechanism where σ is the adjustment coefficient. If σ =1,
equilibrium price P* at time t equals to actual price P. When σ<1, it indicates the
percentage at which actual prices would move to an equilibrium price (DiPasquale
and Wheaton, 1994).

Dt ( P * , X 1 )  S t ( P * , X 2 )

[1]

Pt  Pt*  (1   ) Pt 1

[2]
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In this study, I try to identify both the demand and supply side relations of
private housing market in Hong Kong. The housing demand depends on the housing
price (lnPPI) and a vector of demand-side variables X1, ie. interest rate (PR) and
income (LnGDP) and price expectation (EXP). This relation can be summarized by
the equation [3]. D is the total demand including turnover demand and potential
sellers‘ reservation demand for total private housing stock. The housing stock was
computed by using data on housing completions. Theoretically, quantity demand
theory suggests that the housing demand is negatively related to housing price and so
we will face a downward sloping demand curve. Conversely, the demand for housing
is a negative function of the interest rate because higher interest rate increases the
cost of consuming housing services (mortgage interest cost rise). In addition, income
level would have a positive effect on housing demand. In housing economic
literature, it is believed that price expectation is a key explanatory variable for
housing demand. When people expect price will continue to go up further, end-user
will enter the market to hedge for rising rental cost or mortgage payment and the
price expectation will encourage investor to enter the market for short term profit or
inflation protection. Given demand for housing is unobservable (actual transactions
data may overstate the demand as housing units can be changed hands few times
within a short period), a reduced form equation [ 5 ] is obtained by bring the equation
[ 3 ] into [ 1 ].

S

is measured by the total stock of private housing units which is

negatively related to housing price.

Dt  0  1Pt   2GDPt  3 PRt   4 EXPt

[ 3 ]

( α1<0, α2>0, α3<0 and α4<0 )
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Figure 1. Turnover Demand, Reservation Demand and Supply
S: Housing stock

PH
DH: Total demand in hot market
PC
dC :Turnover
demand in cold
market

Dc: Total demand in cold market
dH :Turnover demand in hot
market

Horizontal Gap represents
reservation demand by sellers

Note: Reservation demand is expected to fall with a higher price, given the same demand curve. In a
hot market, however, potential sellers will search longer looking for a better price believing they can
afford to wait. This translates to a higher reservation demand. This is as shown in the above diagram.
However, the decline in reservation demand with a higher price for the same demand curve has not
been shown for simplicity.)
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[5]

[6]

The estimated equation [5] is the long run housing price level given the demand
side variables including per capita GDP, prime rate, expectation and stock of housing.
As discussed in the last section, market clearing that equilibrates ―turnover supply‖
67

with ―turnover demand‖ does not imply equilibrium in terms of longer term demand
and longer term supply responses. Costly search (both buyers and sellers) and
reservation demand from the home owners would fluctuate in the short term thereby
contributing to a short term fluctuation in ―turnover supply‖, leading to a deviation of
actual price from its long term value. Figure 1 illustrates that the turnover demand
plus the reservation demand equal to the total demand or the total supply of housing
stock. A rise in turnover demand to the right (from dc to dH) may arise from buyers
cutting down the time of their search or an increase in the number of buyers. This
will trigger a rise in the price prompting home sellers to lengthen their time of search
for higher bids as the marginal cost of searching a higher bidder is lower when there
are more potential buyers in the market. This will immediately translate into higher
reservation demand and reduce ―turnover supply.‖ The total demand curve would
shift from DC to DH and so the price level would be driven up in the short term to PC
from PH. If the reservation demand drops when transactions increase, the price would
be lie between the PH and PC depending on the changes in the level of reservation
demand which depends on the marginal benefits and costs of searching faced both by
the sellers and the potential buyers. While actual prices may deviate from their long
run values temporarily but it should covert to its long run values in longer time
horizon. The vector error correction model would help to investigate such adjustment.
e
Let △Pt denote the change in housing price at time t, and P   ( P  P ) ,

where σ capture the adjustment percentage at each period toward ―the long run
equilibrium‖—which is the state consistent with ―normal search‖ on the part of
buyers as well as ―on the part of sellers.‖ Any deviation from ―normal‖ or ―natural‖
search will trigger a momentary change in ―turnover demand‖ or ―turnover
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supply.‖17

In the error correction model [ 6], ECM is the error correction term
e

which equals to Pt-1 – P

t-1 ,

e

where P is the long run prices given the demand-side

variables X1 and σ capture the adjustment percentage at each period toward the long
run values.

The supply of housing follows a differential equation (see equation [ 7] ) where
the stock slowly depreciates at a rate δ and expands gradually with new construction,
C, which depends on housing price, P, and other cost variables X2 such as land,
interest, and building material cost. On the supply side, given that the demolition rate
in Hong Kong during the last decade is just around 0.5% (Hong Kong Property
Review, various years) and so I simply assume θ equal to zero. Therefore, supply
of private housing at any time equal to the new housing completion, i.e. △S = C (P,
X2). The supply side relations can by summarized by the equation [8]. The supply of
housing as measured by the private housing completion (LnCOMP) is positively
related to price so that the supply curve is upward slopping and the LnCOMP is
negatively related to other cost variables X2. In the study, costs are proxied by the
land cost and interest rate. Given that the current price level and cost variables should
not have any influences on current housing completion, Ct in equation [8] is defined
to lead 4 quarters (t+4) ahead of the supply side determinants at time t. The Ct is a 4
quarter moving average data (average of current period and its past three quarters),
therefore, any change in the independent variables will affect the future housing
completion (around 1.5-2 years).

17

Some ―norm‖ is implicit in the ―long run.‖
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St  Ct  St  ( St ( P, X 2 )  St )  St

[7]

Ct  0  1Pt   2 PRt  3 LANDt

[ 8]

*

(β1>0,

β2<0, β3<0)

4. Data and Methodology

The land cost variable is an unpublished statistics conducted by the Censes and
Statistics Department. All property developers (excluding those very small ones) in
Hong Kong report an estimated land values for the first and fourth quarters including
projects under construction and land reserve. It is believed that the land price is quite
stable in short term so the data for second and third quarters are an average value of
the first and fourth quarters (Q2 = Q1 + (Q4-Q1)/3, and Q3=Q2 + (Q4-Q1)/3). It is
noted that the data on land price is only available starting from 1985 to 2008Q4.

Many past studies indicate that price expectation play an important role in
explaining housing price movements. Once prices have increased for a period of time,
people would tend to believe that the upward trend will continue in foreseeable
future (backward looking approach). Philips (1988) and Brown et al (1994) studies
assumed that price expectations were formed by observing past and current values of
different variables including inflation rate, interest rate. DiPasquale and Wheaton
(1994) observed that using recent past prices data as a proxy for future price
expectation would be problematic as they are highly correlated with the current price
and therefore would lead to serial price correlation.
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In this study, I borrow the concept of PE ratio in stock analysis to analysis the
housing market. When a company with a higher PE ratio, investor would expect that
the future profit growth rate (e.g. IT or new technology companies during IT bubbles)
would be much faster than those company with low PE (e.g. public utilities
companies). The ―PE ratios‖ in housing market are calculated as follows: average
property price/m2 (P) to average rental income/m2 per month X 12 (E) (data obtained
from Hong Kong Property Review, various years). Figure 2 shows that PE ratio of
Hong Kong housing market. As can be seen, the PE ratio peaked at 27 in 1997 and
then dropped to about 16 in 2003. In recent months, the PE ratio appears to be
approaching the peak in 1997 again.

The willingness of people to accept a lower

rental return in the property market in recent years could be a result of very low
deposit rate. Instead of the gross rental yield, I shall consider the premium of the
rental yield over the 3-months Hong Kong deposit rate. Based on this alternative
measure, Figure 3 indicates a different pattern on picturing the housing price
expectation. We can see that the yield (net return) equals to -1.3% in 1997 which
means that people were willing to accept a negative return from rental income,
indicating they should be very optimistic on the future price appreciation. The short
term negative rental return was immaterial compared to the possible capital gain. In
fact, housing unit as an illiquid asset should enjoy a higher return than holding cash.
When people were willing to accept a negative net return, as in 1997, their
expectation about price appreciation must be very optimistic. In 2009, even though
the Hong Kong property price had risen over 30% from the bottom at the Financial
Tsunami in late 2008, the net yield was still a positive 3.84% in 2009Q4 which is
still higher the 25 years average (3.53%). The net yield variable is employed in this
study as a proxy of price expectation. Given that the more negative net yield reflects
higher price expectation, therefore, it is expected that the net yield and property
73

prices are negatively related.

For the source and definition of other variables that are analyzed, please see
Appendix 1. Figure 4 – 5 show the movements of the key variables. This study
employs quarterly data from 1984 to 2008. This is a period with a stable monetary
regime as well as a period of relative political stability after the signing of the
Sino-British Joint Declaration removing much of the uncertainty about Hong Kong
future. This study basically follows the work of DiPasquale and Wheaton (1994) and
Yong (2004) by using a cointegration approach which can help to identify any
short-run and long run relations among variables and investigate the disequilibrium
structure.

5. Empirical Results

4.1.
a.

Supply and Demand Dynamics of Housing Market
Test Results for Unit Roots
We begin the estimation by testing the stationary properties of the variables

using the Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) Test (Dickey and Fuller, 1981). The
following equation is estimated for each of the time series:
k

ΔX t  α 0  α 1 t  βX t 1  ∑δ i ΔX t i  η t
i 1

where Δ is the first difference operator, t is the time trend, k denotes the
number of lags used and  is the error term. The null hypothesis that series X is
non-stationary can be rejected if  is statistically significant with negative sign. The
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optimal lag k, is chosen by the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC). Table 1 shows
that the test statistics for all the series in level form and in their first differences,
respectively. The fact that the null hypothesis of unit root cannot be rejected when
the series are in level but can be rejected when the series are in first differences
clearly indicates that all the series in the system are integrated of order one, and
therefore no further unit root tests are performed.

Table 1. Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test of Unit Root (Period: 1984 to 2008 )
Variable name
Test on
No Trend
Trend
Conclusion
LnLAND

LnPGDP

PR

LnCOMP

EXPInverse

LnGSTOCK

LnSTOCK

Level

-2.3755

-1.2543

1st diff

-3.1851**

-3.8325**

Level

-2.4056

-1.2939

1st diff

-4.1315***

-5.0592***

Level

-2.6159*

-3.2236*

1st diff

-3.6437***

-3.8136**

Level

-1.5716

-2.2882

1st diff

-7.6831***

-7.8391***

Level

-2.7600*

-2.9722

1st diff

-3.2357**

-3.2613*

Level

-1.9437

-2.3584

1st diff

-5.5817***

-5.6519***

Level

-2.7057

-0.2987

1st diff

-2.8813**

-3.57014**

I(1)

I(1)

I(1)

I(1)

I(1)

I(1)

I(1)

Note:
1. 5% critical value for the augmented Dickey-Fuller tests that include constant; and constant
plus trend = -2.8892 and -3.4500 respectively.
2.
The numbers of lags in the two unit root tests are determined by the AIC
3.
*, ** and *** indicates 10, 5% and 1% significance level respectively.

b.

Test Results for Cointegration
The variables were largely confirmed by ADF test as in order one I(1), the next

step is to carry out co-integration analyses of the variables. The cointegation analysis
is applied to equation (5) and (9). I chose the lag structure by using the Akaike‘s
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Information Criterion (AIC), which determines 3 lags in VECM.

The cointegration test results are presented in Table 2. The number of
co-integrating vectors r is determined by reference to the λmax and the trace statistics.
As can be seen, λ max statistics indicate that there are two cointegrating vectors (r =
2) among the six variables at 5% significant level while the trace statistic indicate
that r=3. The results are generally consistent with the previous discussion and I will
proceed on the analysis with two cointegrating vectors.

Table 2. Johansen Cointegrating Test Result (Period 1986 to 2008)
Variables
Null
Alternative
Test
Hypothesis

Hypothesis

Statistics

LnPPI, LnPGDP,

Trace tests:

Trace Value

PR, LnCOMP,

r=0

r>0

178.88***

LnLAND,

r≦1

r>1

112.68***

EXPInverse,

r≦2

r>2

74.01**

LnPSTOCK
λ max Value

λ max tests:
r=0

r=1

66.14***

r=1

r=2

38.67**

r=2

r=3

30.96

Notes:
1.
*** and ** denote 1% and 5% significant level respectively
2.
Test assumption: Linear deterministic trend in the data
3.
r indicates the number of cointegrating vectors.
4.
Lags interval = 3 is determined by AIC criterion.
5.
98Q1 dummy is treated as exogenous variable

Having determined that the number of cointegrating vectors r = 2, the next step
is to identify the cointegrating vectors and to test if the restrictions suggested by our
theoretical model(i.e. including the demand side variables in the first cointegrating
equation, and the supply side variables in the second cointgrating equation) are
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statistically acceptable. The estimated cointegrating equations and the results on test
of restrictions are reported in the Table 3. The LR static to the restrictions (i.e. H0=
β14 =β15 = 0 and β22 = β26=β27 = 0) is 6.7243 with a P-value of 0.081. Therefore, the
restrictions are accepted and so our prior hypotheses are not rejected at 5%
significant level.

Table 3. Normalized Long-run Cointegrating Coefficients & Test of restrictions
Variables
CointEq 2
CointEq 2
(Demand Model)
(Supply Model)
LnPPI
LnCOMP
LnPPI

1

-1.2609
(-4.1209)***

LnPGDP

-1.6797

0.00

(-15.2892)***
PR

0.0821
(6.9910)***

0.1549
(5.0685)***

LnCOMP

0

1

LnLAND

0

1.0793
(3.2102)***

EXPInverse

0.1106

0

(9.3099)***
LnPSTOCK

1.4478

0

(10.2283)***
Constant

-19.0037

-14.6363

Test of cointegration restrictions:
H0= β14 =β15 = 0 and β22 = β26=β27 = 0
LR Test: χ2 = 6.7243, p-value = 0.0768
Notes:

1.
2.

** and *** denotes significance at 5% and 1%%level respectively.
Numbers in parentheses are t-statistics.
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All variables in cointegrating equation 1 and 2 carry with a significant expected
signs. The first cointegrating vector (demand side) suggests there is a negative
relation between prime rate, private housing stock, expectation (more negative =
higher expectation) and property price. The housing demand is positively related to
the PGDP. The second vector (supply side) suggests the private housing completion
is positively related to the property price, and negatively related to the cost variables:
prime rate and land Price.

c.

Identifying Long Run Relation
The above modeling identifies two long run relations among the six variables i.e.

for

the

1)

demand

side:

LnPPI

=

1.6797*LnPGDP

–

0.0821*PR

–

0.1106*EXPInverse – 1.4478*LnPSTOCK + 19.0037 and for the 2) supply side:
LnCOMP = 1.2610*LnPPI – 0.1549*PR – 1.0793*LnLAND+14.6363. Figure 5
shows the two restricted cointegrating vectors. Both vectors appear to be stationary
throughout the study period and mean reverting. The deviations of the vectors to its
long run value can be regards as short term disequilibrium or shocks in the housing
demand and supply.

As can be seen in the Figure 6, the demand of the stock of housing in general
appears to be quite stable between 1985 and 1997 given the prevailing level of
income, housing price and interest rate. The demand of the stock of housing had
experienced an obvious decline from 1997 to 2003. The period covered both the
Asian Financial Crisis and the Tenants Purchase Scheme (TPS)—the public housing
privatization program of the Housing Authority. The first paper provided strong
evidence that the effect of TPS on the demand for housing was significantly larger
than that of the Asian Financial Crisis. In 1996 and 1997 close to 10,000 households
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gave up their units each year, after 1997 the flow out of public rental housing fell
suddenly. The immediate effect of the TPS is that buyers almost disappeared
completely from the HOS market. The prices of private housing units, which had all
along depended on HOS owners to trade up, also plummeted. We should therefore
expect that the housing price should decrease in order to ensure the housing demand
would adjust upward to its long run level. The adjustment took few years and until
2004, we could see there was a strong rebound in the demand for housing.

Figure 6. Residuals from CointEq1 (Demand Side) & CointEq2 (Supple Side)

Note:
Cointegrating Eq(1): LnPPI = 1.6797*LnPGDP – 0.0821*PR – 0.1106*EXPInverse –
1.4478*LnPSTOCK + 19.0037
Cointegrating Eq (2): LnCOMP = 1.2610*LnPPI – 0.1549*PR – 1.0793*LnLAND+14.6363

On the supply side, as can be seen in the Figure 6, the supply of private housing
in general appears to have been quite fluctuated between during the study period
given the prevailing level of housing price, land cost and interest rate. In 1996,
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LnCOMP obviously had been below its desired level significantly. This could be the
outcome of the anti-speculation measures announced in June 1994. The property
price had been dropped nearly 2 years afterward. Since the building of new units
needs to take few years to complete, the response of supply would be very slow
(inelastic) in the short run. Therefore, the supply gap was occurred 2 years later in
response to the introduction of anti-speculation measures and policy uncertainty.

On the other hand, during 2000 and 2003, we can see the supply of housing
returned to above its long run desired level. This could be the result of the slow
supply response to the high level of housing price during 1996-1997, contributing to
an overshooting in supply in 2000 to 2003. The increase in supply during this period
was also attributed to the 85,000 announced in 1997. For the vector to return to its
long run level, either the supply of housing or housing price (or both) must adjust
downward. Therefore, unless the supply of housing contracted significantly, it is
expected that the housing prices should decrease. This is also consistent with the
evidence of the housing price downward trend during the 2000 and 2003.

In view of the continuing weakness of the housing market—amounting to close
to 70% of decline since the peak in 1997, the government essentially reversed its
earlier policy of increasing supply and selling public housing cheaply.

Housing

Secretary Michael Suen announced ―Nine measures‖ to stabilize the market in late
2002.

From then on the government began to control the land supply through the land
application list system. Since then, the supply of private housing has dropped below
the equilibrium for a few years and we can see the disequilibrium was relatively
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large in 2008. In retrospect, the Hong Kong government intervened the housing
supply three times, i.e. in 1994, 1997 and 2002. Intervention each time, however,
would only end up with either a surplus or a shortage in supply a few years after
policies were implemented, undermining the market forces to restore equilibrium.
This time around, however, reversing the TPS program has been seen as fundamental
to the long term recovery of the Hong Kong housing market (Ho and Wong, 2005).

d.

Impulse Responses
The above analysis provides evidence on the existence of long-run cointegrating

relations among the variables. To provide a more comprehensive analysis of short
term dynamic properties of the model, the impulse response analysis will be
conducted in this section.

Impulse response functions show the response paths of each endogenous
variable to a one-time shock (=one standard deviation) to other variables in the
system. As far as the research focus is concerned, I am interested in the responses of
LnCOMP and LnPPI to shocks in other variables18. Figure 7 plots the response of
LnPPI to various shocks. As can be seen, the negative effects of PR and LnCOMP on
LnPPI are strong in the short term and these impacts are weaken in the long run and
the impacts of interest rate is even positive in longer time horizon. A shock to
LnLAND and LnPGDP induce strong positive impacts on LnPPI, in particularly, the
impact of shock in LnPGDP on LnPPI is very significant in short run and this effect
will remain over time. As expected, the EXP has a negative impact on the LnPPI and
the impact will remain over a longer time horizon.

18

The results are insensitive to different ordering of the variables.
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Figure 8 shows the responses of LnCOMP to one standard deviation shocks in
LnPPI, LnPGDP, PR, LnLAND, EXP. The negative effect of LnLAND on LnCOMP
is quite substantially negative in the short term and its effect remains stable in the
long run. A shock to housing price (LnPPI) has no impacts on completion for the
first two quarters and it induces only a moderate increase in LnCOMP after fours
quarters and then the positive effect remains stable up to 20 quarters. A shock to
LnPGDP on LnCOMP is also positive in short run only (up to 2 quarters) and
diminishes eventually. Interest rate only generates a short term impacts on LnCOMP.
Overall, the supply of housing are not responsive to housing price in short run
supporting the views that there is a large constraints on the supply side of the market.

Figure 7. Impulse Responses of LnPPI to One Standard Shocks
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Figure 8. Impulse Responses of LnCOMP to One Standard Shocks

e. Price Expectation and Supply Dynamics
As mentioned, government intervention often ends up with either a surplus or a
shortage in supply. Given that any plan to increase supply will not affect actual
supply after at least three or four years, trying to adjust the supply to demand appears
to be out of the question. In recent months, there is a widespread belief that with the
supply of housing remaining at historical low levels for the coming few years,
housing price should continue to go up further in foreseeable future. Instead of trying
to adjust supply to a fluctuating demand, should the government set up an annual
production target, such as one based on a 10 year average of housing units taken up ,
or one based on household formation or other demographic data? In this section, I
will investigate the relation between the future private housing production (actual
total completion for coming two year) and price expectation.
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The cointegration test results are presented in Table 4. The number of
co-integrating vectors r is determined by reference to the λmax and the trace statistics.
As can be seen, λmax statistic indicates that there is one cointegrating vectors among
between the two variables at 10% significant level while the Trace statistic indicates
that there is no cointegration. I will proceed on the analysis with one cointegrating
vector.

Table 4. Johansen Cointegrating Test Result (Period 1986o 2008)
Variables
Null
Alternative
Test
Hypothesis
EXP and lnFCOMP

Hypothesis

Trace tests:

Statistics
Trace Value

r=0

r>0

12.56

r≦1

r>1

0.18
λ max Value

λ max tests:
r=0

r=1

12.38*

r=1

r=2

0.18

Notes:
1.
* denotes 10 % significant level
2.
Test assumption: Linear deterministic trend in the data
3.
r indicates the number of cointegrating vectors.
4.
Lags interval = 2 is determined by AIC criterion.
5.
98Q1 dummy is treated as exogenous variable

Table 5. Normalized Cointegrating Coefficients Using the Johansen Procedure
Cointegrating equation:
Coefficient
t-statistic
EXP = f (LnFCOMP)
EXP
LnFCOMP
Notes:

1
-4.5894

2.4882**

1. ** denotes significance at 5% level
2. optimal lags are determined by AIC criterion.
3. D98 and interactive dummies are treated as exogenous I(0) variables in the
cointegrating equation.

The estimated cointegrating equation is reported in the Table 5. The completion
of private housing units for t + 8 (2 years) is positively related to the EXP at time t.
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The coefficient is significant with the expected sign. That is: the lower the
completion of private units for the coming two years, the higher will be the
expectation for a price increase today and therefore affect the current housing price
level. Hong Kong‘s experiences tell us that the government intervened the market
when it almost at the peak or bottom of the cycle while the economic cycle could
change much faster than the changes in supply as it is very inelastic in the short run.

Figure 9.

Number of Domestic Households („000) and
Owner-occupiers % 1982-2009
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Notes: Owner occupies including private housing and subsidized sales flats.
Source: Quarterly Report on General Household Survey, Censes and Statistics Department of HKSAR

Just as William Poole (2001) observed, it is very important that the central bank
not take a position on the level of prices in asset markets. ―It is very easy to be wrong
about the appropriate level; the judgment ought to be left to the market.‖ For a small
open economy blessed with low tax rates, respect for the rule of law, excellent
infrastructure and market institutions, a well educated labor force, an efficient civil
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service, and laissez faire policy, housing and office prices are likely to be high
because these favorable factors tend to attract capital. But this is in itself not a cause
for concern. If the importance of the housing sector in the economy is a natural
outcome of market forces and the natural development of the economy, there must be
a good reason for it. On the other hand, it will not be desirable to artificially boost
housing prices by limiting supply or cool down the market by boosting supply. The
supply should be set at levels commensurate with the needs of the community as
suggested by such factors as household formation and general economic conditions.
In fact, the demand for housing are relatively stable, the government can set up a
production target using the past 5 or 10 years housing unit take up or household
formation data as a reference (Figure 9). Potential home buyer‘s price expectation
would be more stable if the future supply is certain.

f.

Causality between Property Price and Land Price
This section attempts to test the direction of causality between LnLAND and

LnPPI. The short-run causal relation between the variables can be investigated by
applying a Waldχ2-test of the joint significance of the lags of other explanatory
variables based on the equations [9] and [10],. As far as the focus is concerned, the
null hypothesis being tested are: H0 : β4= 0 (eq 9) and H0 : β1= 0 (eq 10). The results
of temporal Granger causality test is shown in the Table 6. Clearly, only the null
hypothesis of LnLAND does not Granger-cause LnPPI is rejected at 10%
significance level. Therefore, based on the result, we can conclude that the direction
of causality only runs from LnLAND to LnPPI but not the other way round.19

19

It should be noted that the Granger causality test does not by itself establish any causal relationship.

It does, however, provide a test to falsify any hypothesized causal relationship.
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Table 6. Temporal Granger Causality Test Result
Dep.Variable
Null Hypothesis

Chi-sq

Prob

DLnLAND

LnPPI does not cause LnLAND

1.3547

0.7162

DLnPPI

LnLAND does not cause LnPPI

6.7039

0.0820*

Notes:
1.
* denotes significance at 10%.
2.
D denotes first difference

The result appears opposite to what economic theory would predict. As the land
input is a derived demand of housing production which is driven by housing price,
the direction of causality should run from land price to housing price. Nevertheless,
every housing unit in the market is unique in terms of quality, decoration, high/low
floor, views, developers, location, etc. Given the uniqueness of each housing unit,
price discovery is not as efficient as might be thought, in other words it is therefore
very difficult and time consuming for owners to obtain an accurate fair market price
for their property. Perhaps, people may have to check recent property transactions
with similar characteristics and then compare with their one, and even different
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t i

banks or property appraisers would provide different price estimations to a flat.
These indicate an accurate estimated price of property involves a high information
cost.

On the other hand, the result of land auction is dispatched quickly and
understood easily. The land auction results also reflect the expectation of future
housing price estimated by property developers. In this senses, it is entirely possible
for the causality runs from the land price to housing price.

Having said this, it

remains true that past land prices do not imply today‘s housing prices, for housing
prices tend to be forward looking and not backward looking.

4.2

Supply of Subsided Sale Unit (HOS): Does it Affect Private Housing

Market?

In recent years, some commentators argued that the increase in supply of
housing, in particular, the HOS housing would produce negative impacts on housing
price and transaction. In fact, HOS housing is not a new thing to the public and it has
long been an important part of housing market during the 1980s and 1990s.

I argued that the HOS housing unit provided public housing tenants with the
first step in the home ownership ladder so that they could begin to move up to higher
quality housing. HOS housing is in the middle of the homeownership ladder between
public housing and private housing. The homeownership ladder refers to the
tendency for homeowners to trade their existing homes for more expensive, better
homes when they have accumulated sufficient equity in their homes and other
savings, and when their ability to service larger loans has gone up. Both
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Ortalo-Magne and Rady (2006) as well as Ho, Ma, and Haurin (2008) provided
theoretical frameworks explaining the working of the homeownership ladder. For a
tenant to become a homeowner, he will need to have accumulated enough savings for
the down-payment, which is not only always required in Hong Kong20 but will help
reduce the mortgage payments down the road.

Figure 10. Completion of HOS housing 1983Q4-2010Q1 (average of 4 quarters)
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Source: Hong Kong Monthly Digest of Statistics, various years, Censes and Statics Dept of HKSAR
government

Prior to 1998, HOS homeowners always made a handsome profit when they
eventually sold their units, notwithstanding the repayment of the implicit land cost
subsidy.

They could sell their units in the open market after having lived in their

units for over 10 years upon repaying such premium subsidies. Starting in June

20

Banks are not permitted to lend more than 60% or 70% of their appraised values, depending on the

value of the homes.

In recent years, this was relaxed but only if the borrower pays an extra premium

and gets coverage for default insurance.
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1997, there was a new arrangement called the HOS Secondary Market, which is a
market with buyers restricted to ―Green Form Applicants,‖21 who are predominantly
public rental housing tenants. HOS owners were allowed to sell from the fourth year
after purchase provided that they sold to such Green Form Applicants, and as long as
they sell to such applicants, they would not need to repay the implicit land cost
subsidy.22 The fact that such transactions in the ―secondary market‖ in 1997 were at
very high prices (see Table 7) suggest that many public housing tenants were really
cash-rich and that they had indeed played an important part in the very strong
housing market in 1996 and 1997 at the time.

Table 7. Actual Transactions of HOS Units in the Secondary Market, Fu
Keung Court*
Usable
High, Middle, Date of Agreement
Price Land Premium
floor area
or Low Floor
to Purchase
US$,000
Discount
Rate(%)
644

Middle

09/1997

506.4

29

644

High

11/1997

461.2

29

645

Middle

04/1998

328.2

29

645

Middle

10/1998

253.8

35

* Fu Keung Court in Wang Tau Hom. An exchange rate of HK$7.8 to 1 US dollar is assumed. Sellers do not
have to pay the land premium discount when they sell in the secondary market that is restricted to public housing
tenants. The buyer will however have to repay the land premium discount upon resale in the future. The land
premium discount is calculated from the formula (Market Price – Sale Price)/Market Price at the time of original
purchase. Source: Downloaded from Housing Authority website at the time of writing from:
http://www.housingauthority.gov.hk/chi/hd/hos/s_market/index.htm

21

Other ―Green Form Applicants‖ include: Authorized occupants of Interim Housing (IH) of the HA,

Allowance recipients of the HA's Rent Allowance for Elderly Scheme (RAES); Applicants on the
Waiting List, Junior civil servants applying for the HALS under the Civil Service Public Housing
Quota, Clearees and victims affected by clearance and natural disaster respectively, or Domestic
tenants affected by Urban Renewal Authority's redevelopment programme. or Divorcees / splitting
households of the HA estates who are issued with Green Form Certificates.
22

From June 1999, HOS owners can sell after two years from the date of purchase in the secondary

market without repayment of the land premium subsidy.

The open market resale date was also

reduced from 10 years to 5 years.
90

The policy to deny well-off tenants the benefits of housing subsidies was further
stepped up in June 1996. Tenants paying double rent were required to declare their
assets and would be required to pay market rent if the values of these assets exceeded
specified limits. This policy provided a big incentive for the well-off tenants to buy
in the private market or HOS housing and gave much impetus to housing prices
through 1997. It is not surprising that 1996 and 1997 were the years with the greatest
number of public housing units returned to the Housing Authority on record.

A number of studies lend support to the ladder effect hypothesis. Stein(1995)
suggests that transactions at the lower tiers of the housing ladder, which may be
triggered by price increases, will lead to more transactions up the ladder. Ho, Ma,
and Haurin (2008) further shows that housing prices of lower-tier housing lead
housing prices in higher tiers, and that lower-tier housing transactions lead
higher-tier housing transactions. In this section, I will investigate the relation
between the actual completion of HOS housing and housing price by using the
cointegration method. As the HOS housing served as the second step for public
housing tenants to trade up in the ownership ladder, and part of the HOS owners will
trade up for more expensive private housing after they have accumulated sufficient
equity (through increase in price and increase in their ability to service larger loans),
the completion of HOS unit should be positively related to the housing price in the
long run. The dependent variable for the test is LnPPI. The explanatory variables
include the log of the exports (LnTX), mortgage rate (MR), price expectation (EXP)
and the log of the completion of HOS unit (LnGCOMP).
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Table 8. Johansen Cointegrating Test Result (Period 1985 to 2009Q4)
Variables
Null
Alternative
Test
Hypothesis

Hypothesis

Statistics

LnPPI, LnEX, MR,

Trace tests:

Trace Value

EXP, LnGCOMP

r=0

r>0

84.83***

r≦1

r>1

51.96**
λ max Value

λ max tests:
r=0

r=1

32.88*

r=1

r=2

23.51

Notes:
1.
* denotes 10% level
2.
Test assumption: Linear deterministic trend in the data
3.
r indicates the number of cointegrating vectors.
4.
Lags interval = 3 is determined by AIC criterion.
5.
98Q1 dummy is treated as exogenous variable

Table 9. Normalized Cointegrating Coefficients Using the Johansen Procedure
Cointegrating equation:
Coefficient
t-statistic
LnPPI = f (LnEX, MR, EXP, LnGCOMP)
LnPPI

1.0000

LnPGDP

-0.7756

-2.8178**

MR

0.0727

1.7209*

EXP

0.1663

2.8791**

LnGCOMP

-0.0235

-4.5799***

Notes:
1. ** and *** denote significance at 5% and 1% level respectively.
2. optimal lags are determined by AIC criterion.
3. D98 and interactive dummies are treated as exogenous I(0) variables in the
cointegrating equation.

The cointegration test results are presented in Table 8. The number of
co-integrating vectors r is determined by reference to the λmax and the trace statistics.
As can be seen, the Trace statistics indicate that there are two cointegrating vectors
among the four variables at 5% significant level while the λmax statistic indicates
that there is only one cointegration among the variables. I will proceed on the
analysis with one cointegrating vector.
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The next step is to identify the cointegrating vectors. The estimated
cointegrating equation is reported in the Table 9. All variables in cointegrating
equation carry the expected signs. The completion of HOS housing unit (LnGCOMP)
is positively related to the LnPPI. The coefficient is very significant, while the
positive effect is modest compared to that of LnPGDP on the housing price. In
contrast to the widely held view that the supply of HOS housing would generate
negative impact on the prices of private housing market, the findings indicate that
HOS housing is an important part in the Hong Kong housing ecology and it is
beneficial to both the public housing tenants and private housing owners in the long
run.

6. Conclusions

This study attempts to investigate the disequilibrium dynamics of private
housing market in Hong Kong. By using the cointegration approach, the paper
identifies two stable cointegrating relations, ie. a long run demand side relation
between property price, prime rate, income, price expectation and stock of private
houisng, and supply side relation between private housing completion, property price,
prime rate and land cost, which shows a short run disequilibrium dynamics in
demand and supply of private housing during 1988 – 2008. Between 1985 and 1997,
the demand of the stock of housing in general appears to have been above its long
run desired level while the supply of housing has been relative stable, moving around
its long run desired level. There had been a positive supply shock and negative
demand shock from 1998 to 2003. Impulse response and variance decomposition
indicate that private housing completion responses very slowly to shock in housing
price indicating a main source of inefficiency in the housing market. The findings
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also indicate that the supply of HOS housing will not produce negative impacts on
the price housing sector.

94

Table 10.

List of Variables and their Definitions

Short form

Description

Data Sources

LnPPI

Log property price index (overall
private domestic housing market
1999=100)

Hong Kong Property Review,
Rating and Valuation Dept
HKSAR Government

LnCOMP

Log Private Residential
Completion Unit (average of
current period and its past three
quarters)

Hong Kong Monthly Digest of
Statistics, Hong Kong Census
and Statistics Dept, HKSAR
Government

LnFCOMP

Log Private Residential
Completion Unit (2 years total
completion)

Hong Kong Monthly Digest of
Statistics, Hong Kong Census
and Statistics Dept, HKSAR
Government

LnGCOMP

Log Subsidized sales Residential
Completion Unit (No. of HOS
housing unit completed by HA
and HS)

Hong Kong Monthly Digest of
Statistics, Hong Kong Census
and Statistics Dept, HKSAR
Government

LnPSTOCK

Log Private Housing Stock (No.
of unit)

Hong Kong Monthly Digest of
Statistics, Hong Kong Census
and Statistics Dept, HKSAR
Government

LnPGDP

Log Gross Domestic Product, Per
capita (Current price, seasonal
adjusted)

Hong Kong Census and
Statistics Dept, HKSAR
Government

LnLAND

Log Estimated Land Price per
GFA sq. m (Current Price)

Unpublished Statistics
conducted by the Censes and
Statistics Dept, HKSAR
Government

EXPInverse

Inverse of Housing price
expectation: The property market
yields: E / P*100 mins the
3-months Hong Kong deposit rate
(in percentage)

Hong Kong Property Review,
various years, Rating and
Valuation Dept and Monthly
Statistical Bulletin, various
issues, HKMA

PR

Prime Rate (in percentage)

Monthly Statistical Bulletin,
various issues, HKMA

.
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